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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The enactment of Montana House Bill ^55» the Professional 
Negotiations Act for Teachers, on July 1, 1971 provided the structure 
for collective action by Montana's Public School Teachers. This 
statute formalized the employment relationship between teachers and 
their school districts, and as such, dealt with major questions of 
law, philosophy, and procedure concerning the right of public school 
teachers to bargain collectively with their employer. The intention 
of this study is to examine the sections of this act that deal with 
unit determination, scope of bargaining, and impasse procedures, in 
an attempt to determine their effect on collective negotiations in 
the field of public education. While these specific sections can be 
examined objectively, the rationale that produced them can not be 
accurately determined. Three divergent professional organizations, 
the Montana Education Association, the Montana School Board Associa­
tion, and the Montana Federation of Teachers, attempted to provide the 
contemplative framework for Montana's collective negotiation statute. 
The resulting legislation was a compromise derived from the drafts 
submitted by these competing professional organizations. The reali­
ties of this dynamic political situation, in which competing philoso­
phies were compromised, is not within the scope of this study.
1
2
A comparative analysis is offered between House Bill 455 and a 
proposed collective negotiation statute, with an examination of the 
assumptions upon which the proposed legislation is predicated. Na­
tional and state historical background information is furnished in 
an attempt to expose the maze of variform legislation that exists in 
the field of collective negotiations in public education. The unique­
ness of public education is probed in order to establish a set of 
assumptions concerning collective negotiations that can be utilized 
to determine the relationship between private employee, public employee 
and public education legislation. These data supply a frame of ref­
erence for examination of House Bill 455 and the proposed legislation.
A copy of each statute is provided (Appendix I and Appendix II).
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
National Background
National Teacher Movement
During the 1970-71 school year the National Education Associa-
1tion estimated that 132 teachers strikes occurred in 1? states.
These work stoppages are an indication of the growing dissatisfaction
teachers feel not only with their working conditions and salaries, but
2with their role in the educational process. Virgil Blanke identified 
six social forces that have contributed to the drive for collective 
teacher action: (1) the elimination of paternalistic administrations,
(2) the emasculation of the teacher role within large and complex 
school systems, (3) increased teacher anxiety and insecurity due to 
organizational complexity, (4) the increasingly difficult task of 
gaining material resources from public taxes, (5) the increase in the 
number of teachers who are vitally concerned about controlling their 
vocational careers, and (6) the membership fight between the National
1"Strikes Decrease, Negotiations Increase in Past Year, NEA 
Reports," Montana Education, September, 1971* p* 16.
2"Teacher Unrest-Cause or Cure," Montana Education, November,
1967, p. 4.
3
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3Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers.
Stimulated by these social forces and spearheaded by resolute
organizations public school teachers are demanding that collective
negotiations and bilateral decision-making replace the traditional
system of brief pro forma hearings and unilateral board decisions.
A teacher movement is rapidly becoming a factor in many school
systems, particularly in large urban areas, and the teachers, or at
least their leaders, are talking about full partnership in the ed-
5ucatxonal enterprise.
The dramatic 1960-62 strikes by the United Federation of 
Teachers, emphasized the need for drastic changes in public education
g
employment relationships. The collective bargaining elections and
subsequent precedent-setting agreements sparked a demand for collective
7action by public school teachers across the country. The legal 
endorsement for this collective action was provided by the Federal 
Government upon the issuance of Executive Order 10988, which grants 
to employees of the federal government some of the same rights to
■^Virgil E. Blanke, "Teachers in Search of Power," The Educational 
Forum, January, 1966, p. 235»
if.Robert E. Doherty, Joan R. Egner and William T. Lowe, The 
Changing Employment Relationship in Public Schools: Implications for
Quality Education, (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1966), p. 9.
5Alan Rosenthal, "Administrator-Teacher Relations: Harmony or
Conflict," Public Administration Review, June, 196?, p. 15^«
g
Charles Cogen, "Changing Patterns of Employment Relations," in 
The Changing Employment Relationship in Public Schools: Implications
for Quality Education, comp, by Robert E. Doherty, Joan R. Egner and 
William T. Lowe, (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1966), p. 9.
c;
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negotiate with employers that are used by employees in the private
o
sector. "There is no question,” according to Cornell University
Professor Robert Doherty,
... that this legal endorsement of bilateral determination of 
employment conditions has encouraged collective activity, and 
when we couple this development with effects of the increasing 
percentage of men teachers, the growing rivalry between the two 
major teacher organizations, and the impact of mounting frustra­
tions in public school teaching, one can only predict that 
thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, more teachers will „ 
shortly be covered by formal and elaborate collective agreements.
Doctor H. T. James described the changes taking place in teacher- 
school board relations to the 1965 White House Conference on Education 
as follows:
The teaching profession is now engaged in a nationwide struggle to 
promote its interests directly with boards of education, thus 
removing the need for reliance or intervention by any level of the 
administrative line. This struggle has been viewed with some 
alarm by those who would label it a dangerous intrusion of labor- 
manageraent concepts into a professional realm. My own conclusion 
is that it is no such thing, but is rather a struggle by profession­
als to achieve the right, rather generally accepted in western 
civilization, to be governed by written rules developed with in­
volvement and consent and not by the caprices of men. American 
schools are still among the most authoritarian institutions in our 
society, and the revolution now in progress may be needed as badly 
as was the elimination of partisan politics from the teacher re­
cruitment process after the turn of the century. The substitution 
of written law and due process for the ubiquitous influence ped- 
dlar has always been viewed as progress after its accomplishment... 
The legitimate function of the school administration should be 
easier to perform after the new agreements are drawn, and the great 
majority of able and qualified professional school administrators 
will welcome the change.^
8Allan M. West, "The Changing Relationship in Public Schools: 
Implications for Quality Education,” in The Changing Employment, comp, 
by Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p. 20.
9Robert E. Doherty, "Letter to a School Board," ilr, February, 
196?, p. 272.
"^H. Thomas James, "Can Urban Schools Be Managed?," The White 
House Conference on Education (consultant papers),(Washington, D.C.,
1965), p. 156.
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NEA-AFT Rivalry
The National Education Association and the American Federation 
of Teachers (AFL-CIO) are both attempting with differing and com­
peting approaches, to provide the organizational structure for col­
lective action by public school teachers. They are endeavoring to 
secure the passage of state laws guaranteeing to teacher groups the 
right to recognition and bargaining. The joint determination by 
school boards, school administrations, and teacher organizations of 
salaries, working conditions, and in some instances curriculum and 
methodology appears to be part of the apparent goal of both organiza­
tions.
The decisive 1961 collective bargaining victory of the American
Federation of Teachers in New York City had the effect of spurring the
conflict between the NEA and the AFT, and their apparently disparate
approaches to collective action by public school teachers. The
American Federation of Teachers is an employee-oriented organization
committed to the principles and goals of trade unionism, and affiliated
11with organized labor. Procedurally this involves, not only the 
tactics of collective bargaining, but also the use of a militant stance, 
exclusion of administrators from teacher organizations, picketing,
12rallies, and the strike as a last resort in very serious situations.
The National Education Association is a non-labor affiliated, pro-
11# Carl J. Megel, ’’Significance of the New York City Teachers 
Collective Bargaining Elections,” American Teacher, February, 1962, 
backcover.
7
fessionally oriented organization which includes both teachers and
13administrators and utilizes the concept of professional negotiations.
These two competing organizations are more pragmatic than the­
oretical, and have employed a barage of semantic differentiation, 
while attempting to organize the same group of workers, in order to 
accomplish approximately the same objectives. There is no basic 
perceivable distinction between the American Federation of Teachers' 
concept of collective bargaining and the National Education Associa­
tion's concept of professional negotiations as employed by their local 
affiliates. While the national organizations have established poli­
cies on such issues as the inclusion or exclusion of supervisory 
personnel, the local organizations include or exclude various cate­
gories of supervisory personnel based on political practicality rather 
than policy. In many cases, particularly in the militant locals, the 
only means of distinguishing an American Federation of Teachers1 local 
from a National Education Association's local rest with the local's 
choice of vocabulary and national affiliation.
Collective Bargaining - A Form of Collective Action
Classically the authority (as distinct from the skill and in­
spiration) to create and implement educational policy has been the 
province of the school board and administrators, on the one hand, and
taxpayers, on the other. In recent years the aspirations of teach- 
 >_____________
13NEA, Department of Classroom Teachers, Classroom Teachers Speak 
on Professional Negotiation (Washington, D.C., NEA, 19&3)» PP« 3-5*
14Morris E. Lasker, "The Influence of Teacher Collective Bar­
gaining on the Quality of Education: Observations of a Board Nego­
tiator," in Changing Employment, comp, by Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p.30.
8
ers, supported in many places by public opinion and recognized in 
many by public authority, whether it be the President of the United 
States, state legislatures, or municipal executives, have been al­
tering the traditional power structure to diffuse the decision-making
15responsibilities between school boards and teachers. Growing num­
bers of teachers are demanding a more regular, formalized, and sys­
tematic procedure for resolving differences between themselves as a 
group and school boards. Some form of collective negotiations between 
representatives of the teacher group and the school board are being
implemented in many school systems as a means of formally admitting
16teachers to the educational decision-making process. Collective
negotiation establishes a legally sanctioned confrontation between
the elected representatives of the teachers and the representatives
of the school board in order to determine jointly a set of terms and
conditions under which the members of the teacher group will consent 
17to work. This procedure provides a democratic process for the re­
solution of existing conflicts; it does not create artificial con­
flicts. Relations between school boards and teachers have always 
evidenced strains arising from the clash between the professional 
norm of individual autonomy for the classroom teacher and the bur­
eaucratic requirements of heirochial authority in a school system.^
15Ibid.
l6Ibid.
17George H. Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining in the Public 
Sector: An Analytical View," (unpublished paper, Cornell University,
1966), p. 2.
18Rosenthal, "Harmony or Conflict", p. 154.
This conflict of interest betvfeen teachers and school boards has
intensified as teachers have become more professional, and more
19interested in improving their school systems. ’’Professionalization,1’
according to Doctor R. G. Corwin, "is a militant process which con-
20tributes to rates of organizational conflict." Collective negotia­
tions are providing a channel for this organizational conflict, while 
serving to revitalize the role of the public school teacher. This 
new procedure is raising the teachers' professional self-image and 
helping transform teachers from docile time-serving bureaucrats into 
virile professionals, intent upon preserving their due measure of 
autonomy.^
This new policy making process in the public schools is not an 
ephemeral movement. Like all human institutions, collective negotia­
tion, whether in public education or elsewhere, is a tool that may be
22productively or destructively used. The interest of teachers, which 
certainly include the right to influence school policy and the condi­
tions of their employment, must be balanced with the interest of a so­
ciety which is relying today more than ever on the public school, to
19Cogen, "Changing Patterns," in Changing Employment, comp, by 
Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p. 13.
20Ronald G. Corwin, "The Development of an Instrument for 
Examining Staff Conflicts in the Public Schools," Cooperative Research 
Project No. 193^, Office of Ed., United States Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, 1963-196^, quoted from the summary of the final 
report, pp. 12-15.
21Charles S. Benson, "Economic Problems of Education Associated 
with Collective Negotiation," in Changing Employment, comp, by Doherty, 
Egner and Lowe, p. 2.
^^Lasker, "Observations," in Changing Employment, comp, by 
Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p. .
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23help bring about broad social improvements. Teacher benefits may­
be emphasized at the expense of student welfare, bargaining issues 
may become politically distorted, and the administration may be 
eclipsed. These possible adverse effects must be considered with 
the potential for improved teacher morale, the introduction of 
creative educational ideas, the consideration of the needs of the
district as a whole, and the presentation of a unified stance to the 
24taxpayers. The results of collective negotiations within public 
education will be constructive, if we accept the assumption that 
those responsible will discharge their obligation to the children of 
America. Professor Robert Doherty accepts this assumption as one of 
the main tenets upon which our public school system is predicated, 
and conclusions that, "...American experience has proved that this 
assumption is valid and that collective negotiation in the schools, 
responsibly exercised, will be a force for the improvement of the 
quality of education."2-'*
One is hesitant to draw too close a parallel between problems 
arising out of teacher-school board relations and corresponding 
situations in private sector collective bargaining. Certainly the 
differences between public and private employment are significant and 
far reaching. Collective negotiations may not be the ideal method for 
resolving labor disputes in public education. However, serious concerns
23Ibid.
2/fIbid., pp. 32-33. 
25Ibid., p. 34.
are raised when this alternative is denied to public school teachers,
26sind public education is left to the vagsiries of crisis bargaining. 
Employees, whether public or private, engage in collective action to 
incresuse their bargaining power. They want a variety of things not 
readily available through individual bargaining. To prohibit col­
lective action does not erase the "wants", it simply diverts or re- 
27presses them. If we accept the previously stated fact that teacher- 
school board conflict is unavoidable, then a means of accomodating 
these competing interests must be established. It is the success of 
collective bargaining as a process to channel conflict in the private
sector that has led to the demands for its extension to the public
20sector and the field of public education.
Divergent Forms of State Legislation 
Since public education is a function of the state, the teacher 
movement has concentrated on the passage of state collective negotia­
tion legislation to replace what has been essentia3.1y ad hoc tinker- 
29ing. Unfortunately, thxs effort has been retarded by a tendency 
among state legislatures to regard collective negotiations by public 
servants, including teachers, as a question of law rather than as a 
matter of public policy.''50 An elaborate legal argument,the doctrine
26William R. Hazard, "Teachers and Collective Bargaining: A
National Dilemma," Public Personnel Review, July, 1968, p. 130.
27Ibid., p. 131.
28G. W. Taylor, "Public Interest in Collective Negotiations in 
Education," Phi- Delta Kappan, September, 1966, p. 23.
29 1Hazard, "National Dilemma," p. 13^.
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of political sovereignty, has been constructed on the tenet that law
makers can not share their publicly delegated rule-making responsibil-
31ities with a group of employees. This circuitous legal reasoning 
prevents an analysis of the issues from the vantage point of public 
policy, and provides the rationale for the continuation of a unilat­
eral power structure in public education. However, state legislatures 
have begun to consider and pass legislation designed to provide for 
collective negotiations between teachers and school boards in the 
various states.
Twenty-eight states have statutes providing for some form of
32collective negotiation in public education, while m  others, school 
boards are forbidden, by either court and/or attorney general ruling, 
statute or constitutional amendment, to allow teachers to enter for­
mally into the educational decision-making process. The states have 
granted or denied the rights necessary to collective teacher action in 
varying degrees. Some states have enacted enabling statutes which 
merely permit negotiations if both parties request them, i/hile others 
compel school boards to bargain, if a majority of the teachers in the 
school system indicate a desire to negotiate. Before teachers can 
engage in collective action they must secure the right to organize
#and the right to obtain recognition, and subsequently the opportunity
33to bargain over at least some substantive matters. A maze of vari­
form alternatives have emerged from the state legislatures in their
31Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 13̂ -.
32"Strikes Decrease," p. 16.
■^Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 5.
attempts to deal with these issues.
Wisconsin became an early leader and enacted a collective ne­
gotiation statute grouping public school teachers with other munici­
pal employees, except law enforcement employees. Numerous state 
legislatures followed this model of grouping teachers with other 
public employees, while adding various qualifications to the statutes 
jurisdiction. The New York statute covers all public employees ex­
cept organized militia, the Michigan statute excludes civil service 
employees of the state, and the New Jersey statute, while not ex­
cluding any category of public employees, excludes supervisory per­
sonnel in all categories. The Wisconsin legislation confers the 
jurisdiction over these employees upon the state labor agencies 
operating in the private sector. While Michigan's legislature 
adopted this alternative, several states, including New York, cre­
ated separate labor agencies to deal with the problems of public 
employee relations. The Connecticut legislature created a separate 
statute covering collective negotiations in public education, and 
provided educational channels, rather than labor channels, for the 
resolution of teacher-school board disputes. Many of the state le­
gislatures that have followed this alternative have enacted legisla- 
tion covering public employees other than teachers which confers jur­
isdiction on the state labor agencies or on a separate public employe 
relations board. Minnesota and several other states have enacted
separate teacher legislation, but provide labor or legal oriented
34procedures for impasse resolution.
34Jean T. McKelvey, "The Role of State Agencies in Public 
Employee Relations," ilr, January, 1967, pp. 187-188.
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These divergent state laws have created dissimilar procedures 
for unit determination, and impasse resolution. For example, some 
statutes, like the Hawaii statute, permit teacher strikes, others,
like the New York statute, prohibit strikes, and some, like the
35Minnesota statute, do not mention the issue. The diverse provisions
of these various statutes can be grouped in four basic categories:
(1) representation, (2) negotiation, (3) impasse, and (4) administra-
tive provisions. The representation provisions determine who shall
be covered by the statute and the type of coverage. The negotiation
provisions determine the scope of the issues that may be raised at
the bargaining table, as well as the mechanics of the negotiating
procedure. The impasse provisions determine the method of resolving
disputes which arise during contract negotiations, and the procedure
for resolving grievances. The administrative provisions determine the
37organizational structure that is necessary to administer the law.
Each category provides the legislators with a myriad of alternatives 
that can be combined in limitless variety.
Montana Background 
Collective Teacher Action 
The editorial comment in the November 1967 issue of Montana 
Education advised school boards and administrators that teacher unrest
35Robert E. Doherty, "The Impact of Teacher Organizations Upon 
Setting School Policies," ilr, May, 1966, p. 516.
36Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School 
Boards and Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard (Ithaca:
Cayuga Press, 1967), p. 46.
^McKelvey, "State Agencies," p. 183.
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would exist in Montana "until teachers are provided salaries fully
commensurate with the social significance of the teaching profession,
as well as a greater role in policy development and other forms of
school decision-making about curriculum, working conditions and other
38personnel policies." The Montana Education Association not only
identified the causes of teacher unrest but proposed voluntary written
agreements, which provide for communication with teachers, boards, and
administration on matters of mutual concern, entered into and carried
out in good faith, as the method by which this turmoil and unrest could
39be avoided and minimized in Montana.
The 8,000 member Montana Education Association^ and the 700 mem-
4 1ber Montana Federation of Teachers attempted to implement bilateral 
decision-making agreements in the school systems across the state. The 
Montana Federation of Teachers labeled this process "collective bar­
gaining," while the Montana Education Association preferred the term 
"professional negotiation." The Montana Education Association's def­
inition of professional negotiation as a process, written and agreed 
to by the school board and the professional association that sets forth 
the intent of both parties to discuss, through their designated repre­
sentatives, questions relating to conditions of work and such other
38"Teacher Unrest," p. 4.
39Ibid.
40"Reorganization Proposal Stirs MEA," Great Falls Tribune, 
April 1, 1970, p. 2.
41"Federation of Teachers Lists Convention Agenda," Great Falls 
Tribune, October 19, 1970, p. 3-
16
42matters as may be mutually agreed to, could be used by the Montana
Federation of Teachers as a definition of collective bargaining by
merely substituting the word union for "professional association" and
bargain for "discuss".
The Montana School Board Association at least partially endorsed
this concept of bilateral decision-making by recommending to its
membership "that they adopt the MEA's proposed professional policies
agreement in such degree as is mutually satisfactory to local boards 
43and MEA units." Montana School Board Association and the Montana
Education Association adopted this posture of voluntary cooperation
in the absence of any state statute requiring or providing for local
teacher-school board agreements, and neither party formally pursued
the development of a collective negotiations statute. This interchange
of ideas excluded the Montana Federation of Teachers.
Owen Nelson, teacher special services director for the Montana
Education Association, established as an immediate goal for 1969 a good
44written professional agreement in each Montana school system. While
the majority of Montana's public school teachers were being heard by
school boards on matters of mutual concern, the process was one of
consultation not bargaining. The Montana Education Association mounted 
•
a drive to alter the procedure by reducing to writing matters of mutual
*̂TDee Cooper, "Professional Negotiation, What Is It?," Montana 
Education (news edition), November, 1968, p. 4.
43"MSBA Endorses MEA's Professional Policies Agreement, Montana 
Education (news edition), November, 1968, p. 1.
44Owen Nelson, "PN Agreements are Needed in Every Montana School 
System, Montana Education, December, 1968, p. 2.
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concern, thus formalizing and institutionalizing the negotiation pro­
cess. By March 1969, 35 per cent of Montana's public school teachers 
were covered by written professional negotiation agreements which 
conformed closely to the sample "Professional Policies Agreement" that 
was distributed by the Montana Education Association and recommended 
by the Montana School Board Association. By April 1970, 88 local 
Montana Education Association affiliates had requested professional 
negotiation agreements with their school boards. Fifty succeeded,
38 were turned down, and another 37 locals did not request xvritten
46bargaining agreements. This drive for written professional agree­
ments by the Montana Education Association sparked a membership drive 
by the Montana Federation of Teachers, and awoke the Montana School 
Board Association to the fact that professional negotiations were in 
the field of public education and the state of Montana to stay.
Montana experienced its first teacher strike in April 1970.
This strike by the Butte local of the Montana Federation of Teachers
i 47effected 450 teachers and nearly 10,000 students, and made the pub­
lic aware of the changes occuring in teacher-school board relations 
around the state. During this period each of these three competing 
^professional organizations began to draft legislation to protect their
-'"35 Per Cent of Montana's Teachers Have PN," Montana Education, 
(News edition), March, 1969, p. 3*
46"Educators Seek Law to Bargain," Great Falls Tribune, April, 
1970, p. 1.
47"Teachers' strike is Settled in Butte," Great Falls Tribune, 
April 14, 1970, p. 1.
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vested interests and support their particular variety of collective 
negotiations.
Proposed Legislation
Collective negotiations statutes, dealing directly or indirectly 
with public school teachers, have been introduced during Montana leg­
islative sessions in widely variant forms. The 1969 Montana legisla­
ture considered two divergent drafts of collective negotiation legis­
lation which grouped teachers with other public employees. Senate Bill 
256 would have granted public employers and public employees the right 
to bargain collectively with jurisdiction being conferred on the State 
Department of Labor and Industry. Representation elections, exclusive 
representation, and unfair labor practices were some of the provisions 
included in the statute. During the same legislative session House 
Bill 512 was introduced to exclude collective bargaining from the pub­
lic sector. These two opposing statutes were designed to provide leg­
al endorsement or condemnation for the increasing collective action by 
Montana teachers. Neither statute became lav/, and the legal status 
of collective negotiations in public education remained unanswered.
Jlo state law prohibited teacher-school board negotiations, or permitted 
such negotiations. They existed only with the consent of the local 
school board.
During the years between the 1969 and the 1971 legislative 
sessions the three professional organizations involved in teacher-school 
board negotiations (MBA, MSBA, and STFT) began to draft statutes to 
provide the guidelines for collective teacher action in Montana. The 
Montana Education Association drafted a bill that would give all state
19
and local public employees collective bargaining rights with limited 
power to strike. A Public Employees Relations Board would have been 
created by the legislation, and would have had the power to halt or 
set conditions on a strike if it endangered public health or safety. 
Public employees would have been permitted to strike, but only after a 
long process involving mediation, fact-finding, a 60-day waiting per­
iod and 10 days notice of intent to strike. The proposed statute would 
have made it mandatory for school boards and other public employers to 
bargain with employees on wages, ’working conditions and other matters.
The Montana School Board Association formed a collective bargain­
ing law for teachers thus separating public education from other forms 
of public employment. The draft included sections excluding adminis­
trators from negotiations, setting limits on v/hat is negotiable, de­
fining unfair labor practices, and creating a "master teacher plan". 
Teachers would have been prevented from striking, school boards would 
have been compelled to meet with teacher groups, and tenure laws would 
have been amended under this proposed statute. The public instruction 
superintendent v/ould be used for hearings and mediation procedures under 
the proposed act.^8
» The Montana Federation of Teachers developed a statute recog­
nizing the right of professional educators to bargain collectively 
and conferring jurisdiction on the State Department of Labor and In­
dustry. The statute included provisions for exclusive representation, 
representation elections, mediation and fact-finding, and unfair labor 
practices. No reference was made in the statute concerning the issue
*f8"Power to Strike Put in MEA Bill," Great Falls Tribune,
November 30, 1970, p. 2.
20
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of teacher strikes.
Four statutes concerning collective negotiations in public 
education were introduced during the 1971 Montana legislative session. 
Organized labor submitted a collective bargaining statute concerning 
public employees, including public school teachers, administered by 
the State Department of Labor and Industry. The Montana Federation of 
Teachers, while supporting in principle the public employee statute 
submitted by organized labor, for reasons of political practicality 
introduced the statute previously described covering only public school 
teachers. The Montana Education Association adopted this same alter­
native of a limited statute covering only public school teachers in an 
effort to develop a joint statute with the Montana School Board Asso­
ciation. These two organizations attempted through a joint committee 
to develop a single statute for submission to the state legislature. 
However, unresolved differences concerning the right to strike and the 
scope of negotiations caused each organization to submit a separate 
draft.'*0
The statute submitted by organized labor, House Bill 165, was 
quickly diluted and eventually defeated. House Bill 264 and House 
Bill 123, the Montana Federation of Teachers and the Montana Education 
Association statutes, were killed without discussion by the House, and 
only the Montana School Board Association statute, House Bill 455* was
49'‘Educators Seek Law to Bargain,” p. 1.
50"School Board Advisor Shies Away From 'Pro-Teacher' Bargain­
ing,” Great Falls Tribune, October 9, 1970, p. 6.
21
d eb a t e d . A f t e r  a process of several amendments House Bill 455 
became Montana law and established the framework for teacher action. 
This statute is not a perfect statute, but is a start in the right 
direction by providing the framework within which to develop nego­
tiation procedures bett^een teachers and school boards throughout the 
state.
51"Boards to Seek Teacher Strike Ban," Great Falls Tribune, 
September 11, 1970* p. 1.
52"PN Law: Impetus to a Challenge," Montana Education, Septem­
ber, 1971, p. 4.
CHAPTER III
UNIQUENESS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
Public Education Employment Relationships
Public education is a unique enterprise in that the normal 
employee-employer relationships can be transcended by a mutual re­
lationship in which teachers, administrators, and school boards 
strive to provide the best possible education for the children of 
their district. This mutual relationship would not eliminate the 
traditional employee-employer relationships with their inevitable 
problems and essential differences of interest, but would provide 
the parties involved with a common perspective for analyzing issues 
of mutual concern. The teaching profession is presently engaged in 
a struggle to determine which one of these two relationships will 
provide the direction for collective negotiations in public education.
Our culture has developed an array of myths and pieces of
folklore in an attempt to deny the applicability of the employee-
53employer relationship to white-collar employment situations, but 
the fact remains that essential differences of interest do exist 
between those who are employed and those who employ, regardless of
53Jack Barbash, "Union Philosophy and the Professional,"
American Federation of Teachers - AFL-CIO, No. 22, p. t̂.
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the character of the work. The field of public education is no
exception. School boards and administrators want greater flexibility
in operating the public schools, while teachers want more professional
and individual autonomy. Once this conflict of interest is recognized,
the fact that neither side can be trusted to adequately protect the
interest of the other must be accepted. The only practical method
to resolve these differences is by an accommodation that is mutually
56acceptable to both parties, and one that permits either party to
57reject the other. Collective bargaining can provide public education 
with a system of due process for the resolution of these employee-
58employer differences.
While it is important to realize that these labor relations 
problems do exist in public education, the potential contained in 
professional educational relationships must be given maximum consider­
ation. If all educators, whether as teacher, administrator, or trustee,
place the welfare of the children in their district as their first 
59responsibility, then collective negotiations can provide an orderly 
means of bilateral decision-making where teachers and school boards can 
pool their expertise for the advancement of education.
5^y Ibid., p. 2.
55Ibid., p. 3«
56Theodore W. Kheel, "Collective Bargaining and Community 
Disputes," Monthly Labor Review, January, 1969, p. 3»
57Barbash, "Union Philosophy," p. 3»
^ Ibid., p. ;+.
59Grover C. Schmidt, Jr., "Professional Negotiations,"
Montana Education, February, 1970, p. ;+.
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Quality Education and Collective Teacher Action
Collective teacher action and quality education can not he con-
60sidered as completely independent phenomena. Teachers engage in 
collective action in an effort to alter their role in the educational 
decision-making process. The changes that are produced in teacher 
employment relations by this collective action will have an impact 
on the manner in which schools are operated and the kind of education 
students receive. The quality of education can be influenced by 
changes in three braod areas: (1) the content of the curriculum,
(2) the mechanical structure employed to transmit the curriculum, 
and (3) the actual teaching procedures.^ As teacher organizations 
attempt to influence factors in these three categories, they will 
effect the quality of education in public schools.
The Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers "...recognizes 
teaching as a profession which requires special educational qualifica­
tions and that to achieve high quality education it is indispensable 
that good relations exist between teaching personnel and their gov­
erning boards" (Appendix XI). The traditional power structure in 
ptiblic education has alienated the faculties from administrators and 
is a real threat to effective education. Collective negotiations 
have the potential to reverse this trend and alter the power structure 
for the improvement of quality education. The understanding and 
sense of joint responsibility engendered by participation could help 
to improve the execution of educational policy, and the additional
^Doherty, Egner and Lowe, Changing Employment, p. ii.
61Lasker, "Observations," in Changing Employment, comp, by
Doherty, Egner and Lox̂ e, p. 30-
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skill and knowledge that is applied by formally incorporating teachers 
in the decision-making process would hopefully produce more effective 
decisions. Where teachers have worked on a problem, shared in devel­
oping alternatives, and participated in decision-making, they will
undoubtedly be more willing to implement policy and adapt to promul- 
62gated change. On the other hand, the primary function of any em­
ployee organization is to improve the well-being of its membership 
and to enhance their established rights. Historically in the private
sectors this involved a minimization of the impact of change upon
63incumbents. If teacher organizations assume this function, the
collective agreements negotiated could create rigid situations at a
time when the public interest clearly demands adaptability from the
public schools. Collective negotiations can, therefore, be a means
whereby the creative spirit of the teaching staff can be harnessed for
64the advancement of education, or it can be a process for reducing 
administrative flexibility in responding to changing educational con­
ditions.
The effect that collective negotiations will have on the quality 
• of public education will to a large extent be determined by the teach­
er's self-image. If teachers perceive their role in the educational 
system as predominately an employee-employer relationship, then their 
organizations will pursue the private sector approach to collective
62Rosenthal, "Harmony or Conflict," p. 156.
Stuart L. Openlander, "Negotiation - Which Road to Follow?," 
The School Administrator, February, 1969, p- 2.
64Cogne, "Changing Patterns," in Changing Employment, comp, by
Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p. 10.
bargaining. Their collective power will be used to demand action or
inaction along a particular line, with primary emphasis being given
65to the concerns of the membership. However, if teachers perceive 
their role as that of a professional, then collective negotiations 
can become an avenue for the expression of their competence on educa­
tional issues. While their collective power could be used to demand 
action or inaction along a particular line, the primary emphasis be­
comes the welfare of the students, not the advancement of the member­
ships' special interests. The acceptance of this professional respon­
sibility does not mean that teachers would subsidize education with 
inadequate salaries, or that school boards would capitulate to every 
teacher demand, rather it means all educators, teachers, administrators, 
and trustees would share a mutual relationship in which the welfare of 
the student is paramount. This professional responsibility does not 
preclude conflicts from accompanying negotiations and might, even, as 
was pointed out above, cause increased conflict as teachers attempt to
broaden their influence in the school system. Conflicts, however, are
66not always divisive and are often responsible for progress.
Scope of Collective Negotiations 
In probing collective teacher action, the issue is not the 
uniqueness of public education per se, but rather the uniqueness of the 
application of collective bargaining in public education. If teacher
65Openlander, "Negotiation," p. 2.
66Cogen, "Changing Patterns," in Changing Employment, comp, by 
Doherty, Egner and Lowe, p. 13.
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organizations voluntarily or through legislation assume the posture 
of merely economic representatives, and bargain solely over wages 
and working conditions, then the differences between teacher-school 
board relations and other public employee-employer relations will be 
minute. However, if teacher organizations pursue professional goals 
through collective negotiations, then teacher-school board relations 
will become increasingly unique as more areas of professional activity 
are brought to the bargaining table.
Any attempt to predict the future of educational negotiation 
is fraught with the danger of oversimplification, however, it seems 
reasonable to assume though presently concerned with gaining power 
through the negotiation process to improve salaries, expand fringe 
benefits, and improve working conditions, teachers are not likely to 
let these remain their exclusive concerns.^ The subject matter of 
negotiations may eventually be as broadly defined as the education 
program itself, as teachers seek to resolve the dissatisifaction they 
feel with their role in the educational process. As classroom teachers 
become recognized as essential and constructive factors in the educa­
tional decision-making process, the collective strength necessary to 
transfer teaching into a legitimate dynamic profession may be provided.
Teachers are in some respects an enigmatic group, uncertain as 
to the direction they want collective negotiations to follow. They 
appear to want the status of a professional and often equate themselves 
with doctors and lawyers, while often pursuing the level of responsi-
67Openlander, "Negotiation," p. 2 .
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68bility associated with organized labor. It is vital that teachers 
accept the fact that, if they expect to negotiate over so-called pro­
fessional issues, they will have to accept the responsibilities of
being professionals. The authority of a profession is rooted in com-
69petence and skill, not in legal power or collective action. Teachers 
must accept this reality, and recognize that the only basis upon which 
they can legitimately participate in decisions concerning curriculum, 
teacher recruitment, class size, and textbook selection, is expert 
knowledge.
If it is in the public interest for teacher organizations to 
bargain over more than the wages and working conditions traditional in 
private sector collective bargaining, then the public has the right 
to expect that professional advice will be based upon skill and compe­
tence, not upon irrelevant concerns* The Kingsport Press case demon­
strates the application of one such irrelevant concern to the selection 
of textbooks. The Kingsport Press is one of the largest integrated 
printers in the nation, printing for, among others, McGraw-Hill, Lip- 
pincott, Grolier, Field Enterprises, Holt, Rinehart, and Harper and 
Row. Five unions, representing the 2,200 workers of Kingsport Press 
went on strike on March 11, 1963, but the company continued to operate 
with supervisors, new hires, and returning strikers. Finding them­
selves unable to win the strike, the five unions called upon the AFL- 
CIO for help. The American Federation of Teachers, a member of the
68A1 Smith, "Technician or Professional," (paper presented in 
partial fulfillment for course ILR 607, Cornell University, 1968), p. 1.
69Openlander, "Negotiation," p. 2.
the APL-CIO, urged its members not to use textbooks printed at Kings­
port, and demanded that boards of education not buy books printed 
70there. A number of school boards capitulated in varying degrees to
the teachers' pressure to institute "secondary boycotts" by restricting
71the purcha.se of books from Kingsport Press. The focal point of 
this example is not whether the strike at Kingsport Press was jus­
tified or not, but rather that only one standard can properly be 
used in the selection of textbooks, and that is how well the textbooks 
serve the educational process. Professional educators must not uti­
lise their collective strength to support a particular vested inter­
est or allow interest groups to shape our educational policies.
Teacher organisations can also supplant educational competence 
during collective negotiations by focusing on the needs of their mem­
bership. One aspect of "wide scope negotiations" where this might 
be true is in the participation by teachers in the establishment of 
teaching standards and teacher education programs. Teacher organisa­
tions seem to have succumbed to the fiction that competence is some­
how synonomous with formal training and longevity, and have supported
typ
the private sector employment concept of "equal pay for equal work."
The test of a profession is its ability to serve others rather than 
itself, and until teachers accept this responsibility their self-inter­
est will compel the surport of tenure laws and the rejection of teacher
°American Teacher, January, 19-^, p* "18 .
' Lasker, 1 ’Obcervat2.ons,1' m  Changing iknployment, comp, by 
Doherty, Lgner and Lowe, p. 30•
70''"Doherty, "Letter to a School Board," p. 1:7-.
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merit systems, where their educational expertise might dictate the 
opposite position.
These two examples clearly depict the problems that exist in 
determining the scope of the educational negotiations. The legisla­
tors' answers to these concerns must be based on their assessment of 
the role of teachers in the educational process, employee, or profes­
sional. The challenge is to take the offensive with change, and, with 
the use of our imagination and ingenuity, develop procedures which
make use of experience, but recognize the potential contained in the
73unique relationships which exist in public education, thus freeing 
us from the precedents, institutional loyalties, and stereotypes 
associated with private sector employment and predicated on the tra­
ditional employee-employer relationships.
Legislative Alternatives
The interpretation of the phrase "terms and conditions of em­
ployment" has been a source of dispute in the private sector, and there 
is every reason to believe that some controversy will exist in the 
public sector. The matter of what is appropriate content for teacher- 
school board collective agreements is a question of public policy that 
must be dealt with in the formation of any collective negotiation 
statute for public education. Unfortunately the scope of negotiations 
has been used by the courts as a counter balance to compensate public 
employees for the loss of the right to strike. A Wisconsin court has 
stated this concern for employee rights as follows:
73Alan M. West, "Quality Education," in Changing Employment,
comp, by Doherty, Egner and Lowe, pp. 22-23.
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The right to compel collective bargaining on certain specific 
issues was substituted for the employee’s historic right to 
strike. This is not precisely a "quid pro quo.” Rather it is 
actually the substitution of a lesser for a greater right. Un­
der such circumstances the lesser right, i.e., the right to compel 
negotiations on issues effecting employment conditions should 
be broadly construed to more equitably balance the scale of 
justice.
The Montana legislature rejected the broad interpretation of 
"terms and conditions of employment," and provided that "...matters 
of negotiation and bargaining for agreement shall not include matters 
of curriculum, policy of operation, selection of teachers and other 
personnel, or physical plant of schools or other school facilities..." 
(Appendix I). The discussion at the bargaining table is therefore 
limited to "...matters relating directly to the employer-teacher 
relationship such as salary, hours, and other terms of employment..." 
(Appendix I). While the negotiations can not go beyond the narrow 
limits of labor precedents, the legislation provides for a dual 
system of negotiation and consultation. Matters relating directly to 
the employer-teacher relationship are subject to bilateral decision­
making, while all other matters are the responsibility of the school 
#board and the administration. However, school boards are required,
...to meet and confer on any proposal advanced by a representa­
tive of teachers, or by a teacher or group of teachers if no 
representative of teachers has been elected, if such proposal 
does not endeavor to amend the terms of a professional negotia­
tions agreement then in effect, and nothing in this act shall be 
construed to diminish such duty (Appendix I).
This obligation permits teachers to consult with school boards on 
matters of curriculum, but prohibits them from introducing such mat­
ters during the bilateral decision-making process of collective
74Wisconsin Circuit Court, "City of Madison v WERB,” Labor Lav;
Reports, Commerce Clearing House, (April 26, 1967), p. 51:702.
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negotiations. A further restriction is placed on the scope of ne­
gotiations by requiring that professional negotiation conferences not 
begin until after November 1 of the last year the collective agree­
ment is effective, and that the teachers or their representative "... 
must serve written notice of intention to negotiate collectively upon 
the employer not later than November 1 of such year stating specifically 
the items to be negotiated" (Appendix I).
The Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers clearly grants 
teachers the "employee" rights of private sector collective bargaining 
to joint determination of salary, hours, and other terms of employ­
ment, while forcing teachers to assume a mere advisory role on matters 
of professional concern. One would hardly expect or desire that cur­
riculum, methodology or educational services be subjected to the pres­
sures that inevitably characterize negotiations over conditions of 
75employment. However, while the content of the curriculum should not 
be subjected to negotiation, the mechanics for determining the content 
should be formulated jointly by teachers and school boards at the bar­
gaining table. The joint determination of such procedures would result 
in the inclusion of teachers in the curriculum decision-making process. 
Teachers would be provided the opportunity to participate in decisions 
on professional matters in an environment which should result in more 
knowledgeable decisions. A sense of professional responsibility is 
likely to be developed among participating teachers. With this alter­
native available, there is little reason to debate professional prob-
75Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations
for Teachers; An Approach to School Administration (Chicago: Rand Mc­
Nally, 196^), p. 244. ~  ——
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lems and make administrative decisions at the negotiating table. In 
order for this to be a viable alternative, however, teachers must be 
able to assume the role of partners not mere advisors.
The proposed statute states ’'...that the board and the certified 
employee organization shall meet at reasonable times and shall nego­
tiate in good faith with respect to terms and conditions of employment” 
(Appendix II). No limiting or qualifying statements are included in 
the statute to further define the phrase "terms and conditions of em- 
ployment.” Therefore we find that the specific items to be negotiated 
are themselves negotiable. This does not mean that school boards 
should relinquish the potver of unilateral determination on all subjects 
broached by the teachers; it means rather that they should not adopt 
a "management rights” stance which precludes discussion, but should 
instead demand (i.e. bargain hard for) retention of unilateral control 
over matters which, in their judgment, merit such.
The broad scope of negotiations possible under the proposed sta­
tute necessitates that the State Department of Education administer
V ' ‘ ’ '
the statute. The determination as to what provisions are necessary or 
what provisions are detrimental to the advancement of quality educa­
tion are matters for professional educators not labor or legal tribu­
nals. The Montana statute with its limited scope of negotiations 
utilizes the district court to administer the statute, and emphasizes 
the employee-employer aspect of the teacher-school board relationship.
76Walter E. Oberer, Kurt L. Hanslowe and' Robert E. Doherty, "The 
Taylor Act: A Primer for School Personnel (and Other Beginners at Col­
lective Negotiations)," 1967* p.
CHAPTER IV
UNIT DETERMINATION
Guide Lines for Unit Determination 
Unit determination in public education is not as colorful an 
issue as the question of should public school teachers have the right 
to strike or as noticeable to the public as the controversy over im­
passe procedures, but it is the necessary first step in any collective
bargaining relationship for it defines the constituency within which
77collective negotiations take place. Before the formal process of 
collective negotiations can begin, the two parties, who are to nego­
tiate, must be established. The statutes of the various states which 
authorize collective negotiations in public education have attempted 
to solve the question of who these parties should be in a myriad of 
divergent procedures. The problem comes not with the employer unit, 
Tor all the legislatures agree that this should be the local school 
board, but with the employee unit. Who should be included in the 
"teacher bargaining" unit and who should be excluded from this unit? 
Should exclusive representation be given to one teacher organization? 
The determination of the appropriate unit is crucial for it defines 
the field on which to play before the contest begins; significantly 
effects who the opponents are going to be; and can have far reaching
77Andrew W. Thomson, "Unit Determination m  Public Employment," 
Public Employee Relations Reports, (Ithaca, Cornell University), p. 1.
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implications for the contest itself.
All the legislatures that have dealt with the problems of unit 
determination have had to answer three basic questions: (1) what is
an appropriate unit, (2) what guide lines should be followed in estab­
lishing the unit, and (5) who should establish the unit? The deter­
mination of the unit directly effects the demands and the effective­
ness of the representation, the independence of the organization, 
the militancy of the organisation, the grievance procedures, and the 
efficiency of the school administration.
The following quotation is taken from the dissenting opinion in 
the May 17, 1966 decision by the Labor Relations Commission of the Com­
monwealth of Massachusetts in a case involving the appropriate bargain­
ing unit in the public schools of Pittsfield, Massachusetts.
I reject the theory that the same standards used in industry and 
trade are applicable here in determining what constitutes an ap­
propriate bargaining unit. I find on all the evidence that the 
supervision exercised by principals down to supervisors is not 
comparable to the supervision exercised by supervisors or fore­
man in industry or trade. On the one hand, a supervisory employ­
ee in industry and trade is primarily concerned with the best 
interests of his employer, and usually has the authority to hire 
• and fire other employees. On the other hand, principals down to 
classroom teachers are primarily concerned with the proper educa­
tion of children. They can neither hire nor fire subordinates.
The authority developing upon them is not comparable. The duties 
with which principals, vice-principals and supervisors are charged 
is to properly educate students. In order to meet this demand, it 
is vital that all members of this profession operate as a team.
I can find no precedent for holding that members within the same 
profession can be excluded from a unit in which other members are 
admitted. To hold that principals, vice-principals and supervis­
ors should be excluded from a unit consisting of school teachers 
in my opinion would create and perpetuate barriers within the 
teaching profession to the detriment of our children and the pro­
fession. 78
V/hether we agree or disagree with the above opinion, that there are
78City of Pittsfield, Case No. MCB-18, reported in Government
Employee Relations Report (BNA), November, 1966, pp. 3-2 and B-3.
significant differences between private industry and public education 
in the area of unit determination, we must recognize the need to dev­
elop some type of criteria or guide lines for determining the appro­
priate bargaining unit in teacher-school board negotiations.
One basic standard or criteria that can be employed is that of 
"the community of interest of the employees." This standard of commu­
nity of interest has been utilized in the private sector since the 
problem of unit determination and the process of collective bargaining 
first began. The National Labor Relations Board has made this stan­
dard a central factor in its unit determination cases. However, like 
any standard it is more easily applied in easy cases than in hard 
cases. For example, it is clear that classroom teachers and the school 
bus drivers do not belong in the same unit (ttnless the primary function 
of the school teachers in that district is driving school buses); but
what about department heads who teach only one class a day, should
79they be included m  a teacher unit?
The NLRB has set down the following rules for determining com­
munity of interest: whether the employees sought to be grouped to­
gether are subject to common iirorking rules, personnel practices, en­
vironment, or salary and benefit structure. Such criteria are, however, 
more suitable for a check list than for actual decision-making, for 
reality is much more complicated. A good example of how complicated 
this problem really is, is the fact that the NLRB often attacks the 
problem from the other end. Instead of asking if any real community 
of interest exists, it asks whether any real conflict of interest ex-
79Oberer, Hanslowe, and Doherty, "The Taylor Act," p. 2k.
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ists among the employees in the proposed unit. This type of approach 
is especially applicable to a small employer or small school district.^ 
Community of interest, however, may be claimed along several 
dimensions, each having its advantages and disadvantages, for example, 
the community of interest of employees with respect to conditions of 
employment applying particularly to them, the community of interest of 
employees with respect to the continuation of a traditional, workable, 
and, on the whole, acceptable negotiating pattern, the community of 
interest of employees with respect to specialization of occupation 
according to a craft or profession, or the community of interest of 
employees with respect to the manner of exercising their right of 
representation.^1
What constitutes a community of interest or a conflict of in­
terest in public education? This question can most accurately be 
determined by the individual school district. In one school dis­
trict department heads may not teach at all, but they may still feel 
their association or interest lies with the teachers. While in 
another school district the department heads may spend half their time 
teaching, but feel their allegiance lies with the administrators. The 
same may be true of building principals. One building principal may 
feel he is the representative of his teachers to the administration 
and another may feel he is the representative of the administration to 
his teachers. While there is a community of interest shared by all 
professional educators in their desire for the advancement of quality 
education, the important point to consider is do the conflict of in-
81Ibid., pp. 2^-25.
terests override the community of interest thereby making it de­
sirable to exclude supervisors from the bargaining unit. The struc­
ture of the community of interest in the individual school district 
should determine the composition of that district's bargaining unit 
or units.
Section 7 of the proposed statute contains guide lines for 
unit determination. Major consideration is given to the community of 
interest of the employees as determined by the employees. It is the 
employees who are being represented, and it is their desires which 
must remain paramount. The other guides, the public interest and 
ease of administration, provide the boundaries within which the em­
ployees can exercise the maximum freedom of choice. The law is 
structured to prevent arbitrary divisions between teachers and admin­
istrators, and to permit either group to be represented separately.
Only two units are possible under the statute, an all inclusive unit 
or separate teacher and administrator units. No more fracturing of 
the certificated personnel is possible. By limiting the number of 
possible units through legislation the public interest has been pre­
served and the ease of administration has been achieved. The employees' 
right to be represented by an organization of their own choosing has 
been balanced against the need for stability in the bargaining rela­
tionship. The decision concerning the composition of the negotiating 
unit is made at the local level based on the local climate, tradition, 
and the effectiveness of past cooperation among school staff members. 
The guide lines are flexible enough to allow diversity where it is 
necessary and prevent arbitrary standards of uniformity. These rather 
nebulous guide lines are administered by an independent third party
39
chosen by the parties involved or the State Education Department.
Bi-Unit Elections
A secret bi-unit election conducted by an independent third 
party is the method of determining representation contained in the 
proposed statute. It would seem senseless for any school board to 
assume the responsibility of designating a representative, except in 
those rare cases where there is no question as to what group repre­
sents the teachers. In the future as the competition between the two 
professional teacher organizations increases these cases will become 
more and more rare. An election conducted by an independent third 
party has the great value of assuring the integrity of the determina­
tion, and this advantage clearly outweighs such disadvantages as the
cost and other disruptions that may occur from campaigning and other
82attendant election procedures. The independence and neutrality of 
the election procedures contained in the Montana Professional Nego­
tiations Act for Teachers are seriously limited by the fact, that the 
school boards are empowered to conduct the elections.
Employing the secret ballot election to resolve questions of 
teacher representation is the only method which insures the free exer­
cise of choice on the part of the teachers. Having the election con­
ducted by a mutually agreed upon third party gives further safeguards 
for the impartiality and fairness of the elections. Reliance upon 
membership lists, authorization cards, or petitions does not assure the 
same freedom as an election because of the lack of secrecy and the
82Robert E. Doherty, Employer-Employee Relations in the Public 
School, (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1967;* p. 69.
83pressure to conform. While an election may not be necessary in 
every case, the problem exists with who is to determine, if an election 
is warranted. To vest this power with one of the parties involved 
in the collective bargaining process, as in the Montana statute, raises 
serious questions about the impartiality of such representation pro­
cedures. An independent third party election is a necessary safeguard 
for both the school board and the teacher organizations. Under the 
proposed statute, all teacher representation will be determined by an 
election conducted by an independent third party, after 30 per cent 
of the teachers in that particular district have petitioned for such 
an election with the State Department of Education.
The 30 per cent "show of interest" requirement as a condition 
for holding an election is an important regulation. This assures the 
school board, v/ho must share the cost of the election with the teachers, 
that there is sufficient desire among the teachers to be represented 
for the purposes of collective bargaining to warrant an election.
Since the petition is filed with the State Department of Education 
rather than the local school board, the proper secrecy is assured the 
teachers whose signatures called for the election.
The State Department of Education is designated as the supervis­
ing agency in the proposed statute. Petitions for election must be 
filed with the State Department of Education and an independent elec­
tion supervisor must be selected by the school board and teachers 
within the legislated time period. If the parties involved can not 
agree on an election supervisor, then the State Department of Educa-
83Ibid., pp. 69-70.
tion has the authority to appoint an independent third party. The 
function of the State Department of Education is not to conduct re­
presentation elections, but rather to insure that if the requirements- 
for an election are.met a fair and impartial election is conducted.
The proposed statute specifies that all representation elections 
must be bi-unit elections. The only basic standards established are 
(1) that the superintendent or chief school officer for the district 
shall not be included in any bargaining unit, and (2) all other cer­
tificated employees shall be given a choice as to the composition of 
the bargaining unit (s). The parties involved and the election super­
visor they designate have the ultimate power within the legislative 
limitations to establish their bargaining units, and no outside agency 
has the authority to repeal or reverse their decisions as to what con­
stitutes an appropriate unit.
The bi-unit election allows local self-determination within 
categorically defined limits in order to protect the public and allow 
the certificated public school employee maximum freedom of choice. All 
the certificated personnel in each school district are divided into 
two separate categories; (1) those with teaching or special services 
certificates, and (2) those with administrative or supervisory certi­
ficates and those engaged in supervisory positions. Those certificated 
employees, such as department heads and teaching vice-principals, which 
can not clearly be placed in one unit or the other have the right under 
the proposed statute to choose to be included in either the "adminis­
trative unit" or the "teacher unit", with the "teacher unit" reserving 
the right to exclude any category of these certificated employees by 
a majority vote. Once determined by the election supervisor these
k2
two groups of certificated employees vote separately, but simultan­
eously, to determine their bargaining representative, and at the same 
time vote to be included in one all inclusive unit, or two separate 
units, or not to be represented at all. Either group has the power 
by a majority vote to exclude the other and form a separate bargaining 
unit.
It is important for the reader to note that the Professional 
Negotiations Act for Teachers grants the opportunity of choice in unit 
determination to only one limited category of certificated employees, 
principals certificated in class 3> and the choice is between the 
"teacher unit" or a unit composed of all principals of a single employ­
er. The "teacher unit" is not afforded the opportunity under the 
Montana statute to reject or accept this category of certificated em­
ployees. The lack of local self-determination and the arbitrary group­
ing of certificated employees greatly reduces the flexibility and the
effectiveness of the Montana statute. The certificated employees 
•should be represented in the "teacher unit" or the "administrative 
unit" based on their relationship to the management hierarchy, and the 
way the other certificated employees perceive this relationship.
Exclusive Representation
The proposed statute and the Montana statute legislate the type 
of representation, rather than allowing the matter to be determined on 
the local level. Exclusive representation is established once an 
organization can command a majority vote in an appropriate unit, and 
a single employee organization represents the entire personnel in the 
negotiating unit. The employer can not negotiate conditions of em­
ployment for anyone in the unit with any other individual or organiza-
k3
tion except the exclusive negotiating agent.
Historically the private sector has moved from the principle of 
representation-for-members-only to the principle of exclusive repre­
sentation. The private sector adopted the latter principle in an 
effort to eliminate the inter-union rivalries and jurisdictional dis­
putes that were causing numerous work stoppages. By granting exclu­
sive representation to the majority representative of the employees, 
the problem of splitting off small units from the employee organiza­
tion and playing one settlement against the next are eliminated. A 
simplified and systematic administration of employer-employee relations 
was made possible by having only one employee organization meeting and 
bargaining over wages, hours, and conditions of employment with the 
employer.
The public interest in maintaining educational peace and stabil­
ity can be best served by the process of exclusive representation.
The teachers are compelled to agree among themselves on a set of bar- 
• gaining proposals before approaching the board, and the board is aided 
by the fact that the exclusive representative is responsible for all 
employees in the unit regardless of whether they vote for the repre­
sentative or not. The alternative to exclusive representation is an 
impracticable arrangement, with school administrations having to face 
many organizations, all of which have different requests and demands 
for small groups of the total number of employees, while the total 
group of employees must be governed by a uniform set of rules and 
policies relating to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.
Election Bar
In order for the process of exclusive representation to be an
equitable procedure the rights of the minority organization must be 
protected. An organization can not be certified as the exclusive 
bargaining unit, under the proposed law, unless it has gained the 
support of 51 per cent of those employees in the appropriate unit 
voting in a representation election. If no organization receives 
such a majority then the unit may not be represented in the formal 
bargaining process until another election is conducted. However, 
once an organization is certified as the exclusive representative of 
the employees or a particular unit, it must represent all the employ­
ees of that unit equally, and not merely at the bargaining table, but 
also through the greivance procedures as well.
The rights of the minority organization are further protected 
by the simple decertification procedure, which requires only 30 per 
cent of the members of the unit to petition the State Department of 
Education in order for another election to be held. However, the 
• interest of the public in having uninterupted service is protected 
by setting the percentage high enough so that elections will not as a 
matter of routine take place every two years and it is also low enough 
so the minority organization does have an opportunity to challenge the 
organization in power. A two year election bar has been incorporated 
in the proposed statute to protect the public, so that if the bargain­
ing representative does change, the inconvenience, no matter how slight 
or large, which accompanies an election will occur only once every 
twenty-four months. This election bar, however, applies only after 
an organization has been certified the exclusive representative.
The two year election bar allows the school board and the ex­
clusive representative to establish a stable and workable relationship
over at least two separate budgetary periods while protecting the 
rights of the minority organization and the teachers' freedom of 
choice. The one-year election bar contained in the Montana statute 
may not allow sufficient time for the development of a collective bar­
gaining relationship, and may further jeopardize this relationship by 
allowing the school boards to request representation elections.
CHAPTER V
IMPASSE PROCEDURES
Contract Disputes 
Impasses that occur in teacher-school board relations can be clas­
sified in two broad categories; (1) disagreements that originate during 
contract negotiations, and (2) disagreements that arise concerning the 
administration of the current collective agreement. If we accept the 
previously stated fact that teacher-school board conflict is unavoidable, 
then a means of accommodating these competing interests must be estab­
lished. Collective negotiations provide a democratic process for the 
resolution of existing conflicts. However, as long as either party has 
th£ ability to refuse an offer made by the other, some orderly procedure 
must exist for reaching mutually satisfactory agreements. The multistep 
dispute mechanism contained in the proposed legislation is designed to 
secure mutually satisfactory agreements within the constraints of the 
following basic assumptions; (1) the desirability of preserving local 
decision-making, (2) the necessity of pursuing educational rather than 
labor channels to assist local decision-making, and (3) the importance of 
the right to strike in compelling the employer to engage in good faith 
negotiations. Mediation, fact-finding and advisory arbitration proce­
dures are provided to aid teachers and school boards in their attempts to 
culminate collective agreements. If these procedures fail to produce a-
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greement between the parties, then the teachers may collectively with­
hold their services. Teachers and school boards are provided with the 
opportunity to solve their disputes with the sanction of public pres­
sure and the application of economic pressure, rather than direct third 
party intervention.
The procedures contained in the proposed statute for resolving
contract disputes promote voluntary local settlements to the maximum
extent possible, while minimizing coercion against the parties involved.
They provide channels for pressure through which outsiders can assist
the parties involved in recognizing the various points of view. Unless
one party stands to lose by not agreeing, however, it can not be said
that any real pressure has been applied. In any economic society, what
84is a feasible solution has been determined by economic power. It is 
the potential use of the strike looming just off stage, that provides 
the pressure needed to produce an agreement. However, it is only the 
resolution of a bargaining impasse which renders the strike a legal wea­
pon, and only after all impasse procedures have been exhausted.
The establishment of a three member mediation panel is the first 
step in the proposed impasse procedures. The teachers and the school 
board each select a member for the panel and the two members chosen 
choose a third member to function as chairman of the panel. In the event 
the two members selected can not select a third, the State Department of 
Education will appoint the third member. The mediation panel acts as a 
master of ceremonies in an attempt to enable the collective negotiations
84Andrew W. J. Thomson, "Strikes and Strike Penalties in Public 
Employment," Public Employee Relations Heports, (Ithaca, Cornell 
University), p. 2.
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to proceed, without providing specific recommendations for settlement.
If this infusion of direction can not assist the parties in resolving 
their differences, then the panel is transformed into a fact-finding 
panel. It should be mentioned at this point that none of the levels 
contained in the proposed impasse procedures are a substitute for good 
faith negotiations. They are designed to stimulate collective bargain­
ing not supplant it.
Fact-finding differs from mediation in that the function of the 
fact-finding panel is not merely to keep the channels of communication 
open between the two parties, but to make specific recommendations that 
can guide the parties towards settlement. Once given these guide lines 
if the parties involved fail to reach a settlement, then the panel may 
make its findings public and bring to bear a rule of reason for shaping 
public opinion. Since the recommendations are not binding this tech­
nique does not deprive the parties of all opportunity or responsibility 
for settlement. The real power of the fact-finding panel is the pub­
licity accorded their report, and the subsequent pressure generated by
85public review of these neutral third party recommendations.
This logic can be applied as well to the final step of the proposed 
impasse procedures, advisory arbitration by the State Department of Ed­
ucation. The Department reviews the dispute and the recommendations of 
the fact-finding panel and advises the parties involved of its recommend­
ations for settlement. If the teachers and the school board are unable 
to reach an agreement utilizing the State Education Department's recom-
Q j~
Richard Pegnetter, "Fact-Finding and Teacher Salary Disputes:
The 1969 Experience in New York State," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, January, 1969, p. 227,
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mendations, then these recommendations are made public. This procedure 
provides the public with a set of guidelines that can be used to eval­
uate a teacher-school board impasse and its effect on the public's right 
to quality education. Review by the elected educational officials of 
the state provides an important safeguard for the public, and can be an 
instrumental factor in forming public opinion. The resolution of the 
dispute is important, but the effect of the settlement on public educa­
tion remains paramount.
The State Department of Education performs an important function 
in the proposed impasse procedures. The use of educational rather than 
labor or legal channels is derived from the broad scope of the subject 
matter permitted by the proposed statute during collective negotiations.
If teachers and boards of education are provided the opportunity to dis­
cuss matters which effect the quality of school programs, then the pub­
lic has the right to expect that the parties administering the impasse 
procedures will have some background in educational research and the 
learning process.
The Montana Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers recognizes 
the need to protect the public's right to high quality education, but 
ultimately places this responsibility with one of the parties directly 
involved in the dispute, the local school board. The Montana statute 
establishes mediation and fact-finding procedures, but fails to provide 
educational channels to aid in the resolution of disputes. The senior 
district judge of the county in which the employer is located assists 
the parties involved if they are unable to select the third member of the 
panel. Noting this exception the mediation and fact-finding procedures 
are similar in both statutes. However, this is where the similarity ends.
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The Montana statute does not provide for any form of advisory arbitra­
tion, and categorically bans the teacher strikes.
Once the mediation and fact-finding procedures contained in the 
Montana statute have been exhausted, the settlement of the dispute rests 
with the local school board. The teachers do not have the right under 
the Montana statute to withhold their services in an attempt to exert 
economic pressure to force the board to reach agreement. The Montana 
Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers "...declares that it recog­
nizes teaching as a profession which requires special educational qual­
ifications and that to achieve high quality education it is indispen­
sable that good relations exist between teaching personnel and their 
governing boards" (Appendix II). The Montana statute rejects unilat­
eral decision-making because such procedures make it easy to ignore 
* legitimate grievances, multilateral decision-making, x̂ hile considerably 
noisier and vastly less comfortable, tends to resolve conflict. However, 
an essential condition of multilateral decision-making is the power of 
each of the parties to defend its own interest. This assumption compels
one to ask the question, how can teachers defend their interests except
86by withholding their services? The strike, after impasse procedures 
have been exhausted, should be legalized because teachers have no other 
effective way to influence decisions of vital concern to them. Logic 
compels us to admit that, without the right to strike, collective bar-
O/-7
gaining is little more than militant supplication.
86Paul C. Eggleston, "Collective Negotiations and the Public In­
terest," (paper presented in partial fulfillment for. course ILH 607, 
Cornell University, 1968), p. 8.
8 7 Ibid., p. 1 0.
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Grievance Procedures
The Montana Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers does not 
provide a procedure for dealing with disputes introduced through the ad­
ministration of the collective agreement. No provision is included in 
the Montana statute permitting collective agreements to contain grie­
vance procedures, or prohibiting them from containing such procedures. 
The proposed statute, however, specifically grants teachers and school 
boards the opportunity to develop local grievance procedures that may 
terminate in binding arbitration. If the local contract does not in­
clude binding arbitration as the final step in their grievance machinery, 
then the proposed statute permits either party to request the State 
Department of Education to arbitrate the grievance after the local 
grievance procedures have been exhausted. Disputes over terms of an 
initial or renewed collective agreement do not constitute a grievance, 
and are excluded from this procedure.
No teacher organization can afford to leave the interpretation of 
the collective agreement to the school administrators; indeed simple 
justice would dictate that all employees be protected by the right to
grieve with the ultimate decision to be made by a neutral third party
88should the grievance proceed that far. According to the American
Association of School Administrators,
In every employment relationship, however enlightened and democratic 
the administration, grievances and dissatisfactions will arise. A 
well-conceived procedure for grievance adjudication which will re­
solve the dissatisfactions and redress the legitimate grievances of
88Doherty, ’’Letter to a School Board,’* p. 2?3«
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staff members is essential to the efficient and harmonious opera­
tion of a school district.°9
An effective grievance procedure, with binding arbitration by an inde­
pendent third party as the final step, protects the integrity of the 
contract and prevents trials of strength over minor items. The griev­
ance procedures contained in the proposed statute allow maximum freedom 
of local determination, while guaranteeing the certificated employees 
the right to have their grievances arbitrated by an agency which is in 
no way beholden to or prejudiced against any party in interest. The 
public interest in uninterupted educational services is insured by the 
proposed statute for the length of any collective agreement.
A grievance procedure provides the judicial process for the ad­
judication of complaints "...based upon an event or condition under
#which an employee works, allegedly caused by misinterpretation or in-
90equitable application of an established policy." It represents the
91presence of procedural due process within a school district and should 
not be confused with the negotiation procedure. The negotiation pro­
cedure is the process for jointly developing employment policies, and 
the grievance procedure is one such policy. While binding arbitration 
is a necessary final step in order to insure the equitable processing of 
grievances arising from the administration of the current collective a- 
greement, this procedure if applied to contract disputes would destroy
89American Association of School Administrators, "School Adminis­
trators View Professional Negotiations," in Readings in Collective 
Negotiations in Public Education comp, by Stanley M. Elam, Myron Lieber- 
man and Michael H. Moskow (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967), p. 210.
9°Ibid.
91Ibid.
the responsibility of the bargaining parties, and transform the negotia­
tors into actors performing for the arbitrator. Teachers and school 
boards would be permitted the luxury of "passing the buck" to the ar­
bitrator, and the public and the teachers would be deprived of respon­
sible and accountable representatives. Good faith negotiating would be
92replaced by hypocrisy and honesty with deception. If compulsory ar­
bitration were imposed on the Montana schools, it would be reasonable 
to expect teachers and school board members, who are just beginning to 
learn what good faith negotiations are all about, to turn their prob­
lems over to their lawyers, who in turn, would make a technical presen-
93tation before a college professor.
Right to Strike
The question of allowing certificated public employees to utilize 
economic pressure, in the form of a strike, in order to resolve a col­
lective bargaining impasse (or prevent such an impasse), revolves around 
the balancing of two sometimes conflicting ideals: private decision­
making and public welfare. Whether in the public or private sector 
these two ideals must be dealt with in formulating any policy concerning 
the legitimacy of employees to engage in work stoppages. Since both 
these variables are abstract ideals, any decision that is reached in an 
attempt to balance these two factors must be essentially a value judg­
ment .
92Charles Cogen, "Compulsory Arbitration," An American Federation 
of Teachers Leadership Paper (Chicago, American Federation of Teachers, 
AFL-CIO)
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For too long the public and its legislators have been content to 
categorically ban strikes in the public sector. It is time that the 
public awoke to the fact that the exclusive use of the "employment cate­
gories," i.e. public or private, is no longer a viable concept in deter­
mining what group of employees should, or should not, have the right to 
collectively withhold their services. This categorical discrimination 
should be eliminated from the field of public education, and this anti­
quated strike ban removed for certificated public employees.
Role of the Strike in Traditional Collective Bargaining 
The following quotation is taken from Chamberlain and Kuhn's college 
textbook on collective bargaining, and expresses the private sector 
concept of the role of the strike in the negotiating process. "... 
though collective bargaining does not and need not always result in
strikes, the possibility or ultimate threat of strikes is a necessary
. . . . 9kcondxtxon for collective bargaxnxng." Collective bargaining, accord­
ing to this theory, is basically a power relationship, with the strike
functioning as the "club in the closet" that enables the joint decision-
95makxng process to function. ^ As long as a strike threatens greater 
loss to at least one of the bargaining parties, if it disagrees rather 
than agrees with the other's demands, there is reason for them to settle. 
Without such a threat the employer and the union might continue to dis­
agree indefinitely and never bargain seriously, each simply refusing to
9kNexl V/. Chamberlaxn and James W. Kuhn, Collective Bargaining,
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 391.
95Donald S. Cullen, "Negotiating Labor-Management Contracts," 
Bulletin 56, (Ithaca, Cornell University, 196?), p. k.
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56give ground in an effort to reach a settlement acceptable to both.
While collective bargaining is a process of voluntary agreement 
this agreement can only be reached when one or both of the parties would 
rather accept the other's terms than face the consequences of disagree­
ment. If this view is correct, then it would seem that merely the right 
to talk with an employer about v/ages, hours, and conditions of employ­
ment is not enough, but some kind of pressure is needed behind the work­
ers' demands in order for a bargain to be consumated. The private sec­
tor has chosen the strike as the appropriate sanction to provide the im­
petus necessary to produce a collective agreement. The following quotation 
from a bulletin by Cornell Professor Donald Cullen summarizes the above 
view point.
Thus, while the strike weapon can be harmful and crude, we don't 
know any better way of granting workers an effective voice in re­
solving the disagreements that inevitably arise between employer 
and employed...this imperfect solution is scarcely unique in our 
society. The ballot box, the cash register, and the jury room all 
render disastrous decisions on occasion, just as the strike does, 
but each provides a means, hopefully democratic, of settling dis­
putes that "good faith" and "reason" alone fail to resolve.97
The strike plays a key motivating role in private sector collective bar­
gaining. While the vast majority of collective negotiations end success­
fully in a collective agreement without a strike, this is not to say that
these agreements would have been reached if employees did not have the
98right to strike looming in the wings off stage. It is only at the
point where either union or management concludes that the loss to it
from a strike would be greater than the "cost" of surrendering on the
97'Cullen, "Negotiating Contracts," p. 5»
^Ibid., p. k.
other’s conditions that an agreement eventuates. The strike, therefore,
in the private sector is an economic weapon to raise the other parties’
99cost of disagreeing relative to agreeing to the first parties* terms. 
Collective bargaining is regarded as a marketing procedure, involving 
the sale of labor services, and the right not to contract is supreme . ̂ ̂
Reasons for Banning Teacher Strikes
Montana public school teachers are placed in a rather perplexing 
situation by the Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers. They are 
told that they should elect collective bargaining representatives and 
engage in collective negotiations with their employers, but they are 
forbidden to utilize the shows of strength which the private sector has 
found necessary in order for this collective process to function suc-
n  101 cessfully.
Most of the traditional arguments against granting government 
employees the right to strike rely in some way upon the sovereignty doc­
trine. This concept states that if public employees are allowed to 
strike, then we are sanctioning their attack upon the sovereignty of the 
state. This argument centers around the fact that the nature of the 
decision-making process is vastly different in the public sector as op­
posed to the private sector. In our democratic system of government, 
responsibility for determining public policy, even conditions of public 
employment, is vested in the elected representatives of the people, sub-
99 - i iHilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 44.
100_. . ,Ibid.
101 Eric Polesar, "Public Employees and the Right to Strike," (a pa­
per delivered before the Public Personnel Association, Ottawa), (Ithaca, 
Cornell University, 196?), p. 9.
ject only to a veto power by the executive, and/or judicial power to
10?declare legislative acts unconstitutional. Legislative bodies, ac­
cording to this point of view, should not be subject to economic pres­
sures exerted by an employee organization. Public employees should not 
be permitted to challenge the ultimate right of the elected lawmakers
to consider and pass legislation, including rules concerning the terms
103of employment for government employees.' The strike is not viewed 
as a legitimate avenue of expression.
The sovereignty doctrine has been a formidable obstacle in the 
path of public employees, but within the last decade it has been weak­
ened beyond the point of repair. The strength of the argument rested 
in the proposition that public employers could not delegate or share 
their legally delegated authority with any other outside organization, 
including an employee organization. However, if this rather narrow and 
legalistic line of reasoning is pursued it would soom be seen that this 
logic precludes any type of collective bargaining at all in the public 
sector. Since the issuing of Executive Order #10988 collective bargain­
ing, in some form or other, has been recognized as a desirable objective 
for all levels of government employees. Therefore, when the sovereignty 
argument is viewed in the context of collective bargaining in the pub­
lic sector, it loses much of its previous sting.
Reliance upon the sovereignty doctrine is often supplemented by 
waving the doctrine of "protecting the public health and safety." Pro­
fessor Moskow addresses himself to this issue in his book, Teachers and 
Unions, when he states:
102Doherty, "Employer-Employee," p. 18.
103Hilderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 23.
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Some authorities still maintain...that'no strike' statutes are 
only constitutional when the health and safety of the public are 
endangered. They would have no objection to 'no strike’ legis­
lation pertaining to policemen and firemen since this (SIC) would 
clearly jeopardize the health and safety of the public. In private 
industry, the Taft-Hartley Act recognizes threats to health and 
safety only if a national emergency is created by the strike, and 
even then only a temporary injunction will be allowed. These au­
thorities feel that statutes should at least say that under some 
circumstances public employees should have the right to strike.
The proposed statute makes a distinction bet\tfeen what is merely an 
inconvenience to the public and itfhat is really harmful to the public 
health and safety. Certificated public employees are placed in the for­
mer category, and are granted a limited right to strike. The public has 
a right to expect that those services which they have delegated the gov­
ernment, and paid for in advance, should be provided on an uninterupted
105basis. While it might be said that strikes by public school teachers 
are inconsistent with the public interest in the uninterupted operation 
of the public schools, the more fundamental and essential public inter­
est must prevail. The equitable resolution of conflict is more impor­
tant to the proper functioning of our society than the dates the schools
, 106 open and close.
If the test of who should or should not be allowed to strike is
that of the public health and safety, rather than that of categorically
public or private employment, then curiously enough, we seem more depen-
107dent upon the private sector. If our national survival were at stake
10 +̂Eoherty and Oberer, Changing of the Guard, p. 98.
105Doherty, "Law and Collective Bargaining for Teachers," Reprint 
197, (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1966), p. 10.
1^Eggleston, Collective Negotiations," p. 8 .
107Polisar, "Public Employees," p. 12.
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in World War II, or the Korean police action, or the current non-war 
in Vietnam, the steel plants of our nation and the production plants 
of Boeing and Lockheed aircraft companies appear far more crucial, than 
a strike by public school teachers. Even at a time of peace, the pri­
vate sector is crucial to our national health and safety, for it is
108upon this sector that we depend for all food, clothing, and shelter.
’Those who assert the unique and critical nature or the public sector as 
the rationale for banning strikes in the public sector fail to muster 
much of an argument. To deny public school teachers the right to strike 
while patiently enduring strikes in vital private industries, i.e. rail­
roads, longshore, and airlines, casts strange shadows over logic and
.. 109equity.
It is important to note that the opposite side of this argument, 
i.e. banning the strike in essential private services as well as in 
publice services, would deprive more workers of the opportunity to sig­
nificantly influence their terms and conditions of employment. The dem­
ocratic resolution of conflict by the parties involved, at times must 
over shadow the need to protect the public health and safety. This is 
not to say that all strikes are necessary and desirable, but rather, if 
we accept the principle of joint employee-employer decision-making with 
respect to terms and conditions of employment then employees must be 
provided with some means of effecting the outcome of these joint decis­
ions. The proposed statute does not provide a perfect solution to this 
dilemma, but offers a reasonable balance between these conflicting in-
108_,Ibid.
10^Haaard, "National Dilemma,11 p. 135*
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terests. Ultimately) however, the balance depends on the certificated 
employees, school boards, legislators, the State Department of Education 
and the voting public. Each has a role to play in promoting harmonious
relations in the field of public education.
The following quotation is taken from the report of the New York Pub­
lic Employee Relations Committee, and expresses two additional reasons 
why strikes should not be allowed in the field of public education.
Instead of the constraints of the market place on collective bar­
gaining, including the right to strike, which are in the private
sector, negotiations in the public sector are subject to the con­
straints imposed by democratic political processes. A work stoppage 
in the private sector involves costs primarily to the direct parti­
cipants...On the other hand, a strike by government employees (there 
can scarcely be a countervailing lockout) introduces an alien force 
in the legislative process. With a few exceptions, there are no 
constraints of the market place. The constraints in the provision 
of ’free services' by government are to be found in the budget al­
location and tax decisions which are made by legislators responsive 
to the public will.110
Both of these additional arguments concern the nature of public 
employment. First, the right to strike in the private sector is bal­
anced on the employer's side by his right to lock out his employees. In 
the public sector it would be impossible for a government agency to
withhold its services from the public merely in an effort to exert eco-
111nomic pressure against its employees. The argument states that by 
granting the employees the right to strike when the comparable economic 
weapon is not available to the employer, we have created an imbalance in 
the collective bargaining relationship between the two parties. The pro­
posed statute prevents this imbalance from occuring by granting the cer-
110"The Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations," Final 
Report, (State of New York, March, 1966), p. 15*
111Doherty, "The Law," p. 10.
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tificated employees only a limited right to strike. The certificated
employees are permitted to engage in a work stoppage only after all
impasse procedures have been exhausted, and those certificated employees
who collectively withhold their services under any other conditions can
lose their collective representation for up to twenty-four months.
Under these circumstances a strike by the certificated school employees
does not create an imbalance in the collective bargaining relationship.
In fact it is designed to relieve an imbalance in this relationship.
The second issue is that the cost of the work stoppage is born not
by the government employer, but by the public. Governmental services
are usually not priced, and in many cases the consumer can not signify
that the cost is too high by refusing to buy; he must by law pay the
112taxes which purchase these services whether he wants them or not. 
According to this hypothesis the public sector is not subject to the 
constraints of the market, and therefore, the economic pressure of a 
strike has no place in this kind of system. This argument fails to 
recognize that public education, like any business, is faced with the 
problem of allocating limited resources. A strike by public school 
teachers may result in the school district losing state and even federal 
aid money, and these represent real market constraints. The public 
schools must compete with other state agencies for the taxpayers* dol­
lars. The current trend by taxpayers of voting against school bond 
issues, clearly demonstrates that the public will not routinely accept 
increases in the school tax rate.
The above has been an effort to list the major reasons experts give
112Doherty and Oberer, Changing of the Guard, p. 98.
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for banning strikes in public education. This list centers around three 
basic arguments: (1) the sovereignty doctrine; (2) the health and safe­
ty doctrine; and (3) the unique nature of the public sector. The reasons 
for banning strikes in public education are too numerous to list in their 
totality, but all of the reasons eventually can be traced in whole or 
part to one of the above general reasons.
Reasons for Granting Teachers a Limited Right to Strike
There appears to be no deep rooted legal obstacles to granting
Montana public school teachers the right to strike. The Montana legisla-
113tures* recognition of a conditional right to strike for nurses con­
quered the legality of the constitutional argument of the sovereignty 
doctrine for all public employees in the state. There can be no doubt 
that the legislature is free to provide by statute that public school 
teachers may enforce their right to collective bargaining by arbitration 
or a strike. Those who base their opposition to the right of teachers 
to strike upon the Montana statutes that currently prohibit such action, 
will find that laws and precedents, like everything else, change with
events. Current legalisms can never be an acceptable substitute for
U n ­clear thinking. A limited right to strike for teachers has been
115established in three states: Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
Labor disputes simply can not be legislated away. Legislation can
116diagnose the ailments but can not cure them. The purpose of collec- 
113Sylvia Weissbradt, "Changes in State Labor Lav/s in 1970," Month­
ly Labor Review, January, 1971, p. 16.
1lZfSggleston, "Collective Negotiations," p. 9.
115Weissbradt, "State Labor Lav/s," pp. 15-16.
1 ̂ Hazard, "National Dilemma," p. 131.
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tive bargaining is to channel conflict, not necessarily to eliminate 
conflict, and in order for this process to function properly both par­
ties must engage in "good faith" negotiations. The right to strike is a 
necessary condition for free collective bargaining, without which the 
employer will only listen and never bargain over employee demands. Tea­
chers will never be fairly represented at the bargaining table until 
they have the ability to support their demands. Collective bargaining 
is basically a power relationship, and one in which no decision, other 
than an employer's unilateral decision, will be reached unless some type 
of sanction is available to the workers. "Thus, it can be seen that 
while strikes may be abhorent to the public and damage the image of
public employees generally, they have proven a benefit to the employees
117and organizations involved."
This quotation taken from a committee report of public employees 
in the Civil Service Employees Association upon voting unanimously to end 
their nineteen year old no-strike pledge crystalizes the reason why the 
strike is the most important type of sanction available to employees. Tea­
chers, along with other public employees, have discovered that the strike
works. There is not now and never can be a substitute for the right of
"*! 18employees to withhold their labor in order to advance their interests.
No satisfactory alternative has yet been advanced to compel the employer to
bargain in good faith. The strike crystalizes that relative economic
119power which is the final determinant in making private agreements.
Although the right to strike may be circumscribed in some instances
^^Polesar, "Public Employees," p.
118Thomson, "Strikes," p. 6.
119Ibid., p. 5-
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in the private industry, its availability for use as an ultimate weapon 
is not supplanted by the Taft-Hartley law. The proposed statute at­
tempts to follow this procedure by legalizing the use of the strike 
only after the prescribed settlement procedures have been exhausted.
This procedure provides teachers and school boards with every oppor­
tunity to negotiate a settlement, while protecting the public's interest 
in uninterupted public education. Since public education is a broadly 
used service, public opinion can enter as a new influence of ponderate
importance to both sides in reckoning their respective costs of agree-
120ment or disagreement. While traditionally public opinion is slow to 
mobilize, community pressure may be stimulated by the fact that parents 
can no longer send their children to school, but must keep them home.
The fact-finding report and the recommendations of the State Department 
of Education are designed to provide the public with the tools necessary 
to intelligently evaluate an impasse. Given this set of circumstances 
the public interest and concern should be easier to generate and apply 
in order to help the parties involved reach an agreement.
The reasons for granting certificated public employees a limited 
right to strike, therefore, rests on the previously advanced argument 
that collective negotiations are desirable in the field of public educa­
tion, and that the right of certificated public employees to collectively 
withhold their services is necessary in order for this joint decision­
making process to function.
120Ililderbrand, "Collective Bargaining," p. 3*
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This study is an examination of the sections of the Montana Pro­
fessional Negotiations Act for Teachers that deal with the scope of 
bargaining, unit determination, and impasse procedures. Their projected 
effect on the field of collective negotiations in public education is 
compared with the corresponding sections contained in a proposed collec­
tive bargaining statute. The two statutes differ significantly in each 
of the three areas.
One of the fundamental differences between the two statutes is 
the role of the State Department of Education in the collective negotia­
tion process. The proposed statute utilizes the State Department of 
Education as the controlling agency for all phases of the proposed leg­
islation, thereby enabling the elected state education officials to 
directly influence the course of collective educational negotiations in 
the state. The position assumed by the State Department of Education 
under the proposed statute is predicated on three basic assumptions; (1) 
public education is a unique enterprise, (2) collective teacher action 
and quality education can not be considered as completely independent 
phenomenon, and (3) teachers should be permitted to pursue professional 
objectives through collective negotiations. Given these assumptions 
the proposed statute provides educational channels rather than legal or 
labor channels for the administration of the statute and the resolution
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of impasse. Since collective teacher action can directly effect the 
quality of public education, the public interest in the advancement of 
public education dictates that those individuals administering the 
law have a background in educational research and the learning process.
The Montana statute incorporates the first of the above assump­
tions, but rejects the others by employing legal channels for dispute 
resolution and limiting the scope of collective negotiations. The teach­
er organizations are permitted to bargain solely over wages and working 
conditions, and are forced to accept the role of merely economic repre­
sentatives. The Montana statute therefore compels teachers to perceive 
their role in the educational system as predominately an employee-employ- 
er relationship. Their organizations will pursue the private sector 
approach to collective bargaining, and employ their collective power to 
demand action or inaction along a particular line with primary emphasis 
being given to the concerns of the membership. While recognizing the 
uniqueness of public education, the Montana statute fails to exploit the 
mutual relationship, that transcends the normal employee-employer rela­
tionship, in which teachers, administrators, and school boards strive to 
provide the best possible education for the children of their district. 
Collective negotiations can provide an orderly means of bilateral deci­
sion-making where teachers and school boards can pool their expertise 
for the advancement of education, if teachers are permitted to bargain 
over professional issues. When teachers perceive their role as that of 
a professional, then collective negotiations can become an avenue for the 
expression of their competence on educational issues. The effect that 
collective negotiations will have on the quality of public education 
will to a large extent be determined by the teachers’ self-image.
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The unit determination section of the Montana statute does not al­
low the certificated employees maximum freedom of local determination.
The statute allows class 3 principals to form a separate unit, but does 
not grant the teachers the option of excluding them. The proposed sta­
tute sets forth a set of guide lines for unit determination and places 
emphasis on the community of interest of the employees as determined by 
the employees. A bi-unit election procedure is employed where the pro­
posed supervisory and teacher units vote simultaneously to determine 
their representatives. One unit can be formed only if both of the pro­
posed units concur.
The Montana statute places the integrity of the recognition pro­
cedures in a precarious position by allowing one of the parties involved, 
the local board of education, to determine the teacher representative.
The integrity of the determination is protected in the proposed statute 
by requiring that an independent third party election be conducted before 
an exclusive representative can be certified. The proposed statute con­
tains a tvro year election bar, with the teachers having the exclusive 
right to call for another election, while the Montana statute contains 
a one year election bar. This bar does not allow sufficient time for 
the development of a collective bargaining relationship and this rela­
tionship is further jeopardized by allowing the school board to request 
representation elections.
The impasse procedures contained in the two statutes differ not 
only in the channels employed to resolve disputes (i.e. educational vs. 
legal) but in the use of advisory arbitration and the right to strike. 
The proposed statute and the Montana statute utilize similar mediation 
and fact-finding procedures, but the proposed statute also includes an
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advisory arbitration procedure by the State Department of Education. 
After this additional procedure has been exhausted the teachers are 
permitted to engage in a legal work stoppage. This limited right to 
strike protects the public's interest in uninterupted educational ser­
vices, while allowing the more fundamental and essential public interest 
to prevail in the equitable resolution of conflict. However, in order 
for joint decision-making to function the employees must have some sanc­
tion available to support their demands. The limited right to strike 
provides the public school teachers with the means necessary to compel 
the school boards to engage in good faith negotiations. Without the 
right to strike, collective negotiation in public education becomes 
little more than militant supplication.
While both the Montana statute and the proposed statute support 
the concept of collective negotiations in public education, the future 
of teacher-school board relations depends on more than a single tech­
nical process for the advancement of education.
APPENDIX I
A PROPOSED ACT CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF CERTIFICATED PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES TO NEGOTIATE COLLECTIVELY WITH BOARDS OF EDUCATION
A BILL FOR AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROCEDURES FOR REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZA­
TIONS OF CERTIFICATED PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES TO NEGOTIATE COLLECTIVE­
LY WITH THE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF THE STATE WITH REFERENCE TO 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT, INCLUSIVE OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, 
WITH THE EXPLICIT INTENT OF PRODUCING A WRITTEN AGREEMENT.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF MONTANA: 
Section 1. Statement of policy and purpose. In pursuance of 
the duty imposed upon it by the constitution to promote public schools 
and to adopt all means necessary and proper to secure to the people 
the advantages and opportunities of education, the legislative assem­
bly hereby declares that it is the public policy of the state and the 
purpose of this act to promote harmonious and cooperative relation­
ships between certificated public school employees and the public by 
assuring effective and orderly operation of the public school system. 
These policies are best effectuated by (1) granting certificated public 
school employees the right of organization and representation, (2) re­
quiring the public school districts of the state to negotiate with and 
enter into written agreements with the certified representative of the 
certificated public school employees, (3) channeling the resolution of
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disputes between certificated public school employees and public school 
districts through the State Department of Education, and (b) granting 
certificated public school employees the right to strike under the pro­
visions of this act.
Section 2. Definitions. As used in this act:
(1) The term "certificated employee" includes any person employed 
by a public school district in a position which requires a certificate 
issued by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
(2) The term "employer" means a school district as defined in 
Section 75-6501, R. C. M. 19^7-
(3) The term "board" means any public school board of trustees.
(4) The term "terms and conditions of employment" means salaries, 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
(5) The term "employee organization" means an organization of any 
kind having as its primary purpose the improvement of the terms and con­
ditions of employment of certificated employees.
(6) The term "administrator" means any certificated employee who 
is employed by a public school district in an administrative capacity 
and who devotes at least fifty per cent of his employed time to adminis­
trative duties.
(7) The term "supervisory employee" means any individual having 
authority in' the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, 
lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other 
employees, or the responsibility to assign work to and direct them, or 
to adjust grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if,
in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not 
merely of a routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of indepen­
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dent judgment. »
(8) The term "appropriate unit" means the unit designated to be 
appropriate for the purpose of collective negotiations and will be 
composed of all or part of the certificated employees of a single 
employer, below the rank of superintendent.
(9) The term "certified" means official recognition by the 
State Department of Education of an employee organization as the ex­
clusive representative for all the employees in an appropriate unit.
(10) The term "strike" means any work stoppage by a certificated 
employee which interferes with the operation of a school or schools, 
which includes abstinence in whole or part from the full, faithful 
and proper performance of the duties of employment, for the purpose 
of inducing, influencing or coercing an employer to change any terms 
or conditions of employment.
Section Right of organization. Certificated employees shall 
have the right to form, join and participate in, or to refrain from 
forming, joining or participating in, any employee organization of 
their own choosing.
Section *f. Right of representation. Certificated employees 
shall have the right to be represented by employee organizations to 
negotiate collectively with their employers in the determination of 
their terms and conditions of employment, and the administration of 
grievances arising thereunder.
Section 5* Recognition of bargaining agent. Boards are hereby 
empowered to recognize employee organizations as the sole and exclu­
sive bargaining agent for all certificated employees in the appropriate 
unit, and to negotiate and enter into written agreements with such em-
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ployee organizations in determining terms and conditions of employment.
Section 6. Obligation to bargain.
(1) Where an employee organization has been certified pursuant to 
the provisions of this act, the board shall be required to negotiate 
collectively and enter into written agreements with said employee or­
ganization in determining terms and conditions of employment.
(2) It shall be the obligation of the board and the employee or­
ganization or their representatives to meet and confer in good faith 
concerning the terms and conditions of employment.
(3) Such good faith negotiations and meetings shall begin within 
ten days after the receipt by the board of written notice from the bar­
gaining agent of the certificated employees requesting a meeting for 
negotiating purposes.
(k) It shall be the mutual obligation of the board and the em­
ployee organization or their representatives to participate in good 
faith in mediation and fact-finding required by this act.
Section 7. Guide lines for unit determination.
(1) The negotiating unit shall be established in accordance with 
the following criteria: the public interest} the community of interest 
of employees; the ease of administration; and the wishes of the employ­
ees.
(2) The appropriate unit shall involve consideration of the max­
imum freedom of choice and community of interest of the employees, in 
so far as these are compatible with the public interest.
Section 8. Election Procedures.
(1) The board and the representatives of the employee organization 
(s) shall jointly select an independent third party to conduct a repre-
7H
sentation election wiwn thirty y&f a ant of fcho certificated employees of 
that district hove petitioned for m»oH on otnctioa with the State De­
partment of Education.
(2) The decisions of the independent third party on the election 
proceedings shall be binding on both parties. If no independent third 
party can be chosen by the parties involved sixty days after the peti­
tion for the election has been submitted to the State Department of 
Education, then the State Department of Education will appoint said 
third party.
(3) The election shall be a bi-unit election. The unit designated 
as the "teacher unit" and the unit designated as the "administrative 
unit" shall hold separate, but simultaneous elections in order to deter­
mine which employee organization should represent them or if no employee 
organization should represent them. Each unit will use a separate se­
cret ballot in a separate voting place to select a negotiating repre­
sentative.
(k) If a category of supervisory employees desires not to be re­
presented with the teachers in the "teacher unit" it must submit to the 
election supervisor a majority petition of those certificated employees 
that are classified by the election supervisor as belonging to that 
particular supervisory category at least ten days prior to the election.
(5 ) If the "teacher unit" desires the exclusion of any category of 
supervisory employees it must submit to the election supervisor a major­
ity petition of all the other members of the "teacher unit" exclusive of 
the members who are in the category being considered for exclusion at 
least ten days prior to the election.
(6) A petition consisting of ten per cent of the members of the
?k
proposed unit is necessary in order to have the name of an employee or­
ganization placed on the ballot.
Section 9. Types of Representation Units.
(1) The unit shall be of local self-determination within categor­
ically defined limits.
(2) A unit could be composed solely of all certificated employees 
of a single employer below the rank of superintendent.
(3) A unit could be composed solely of all certificated employees 
employed and engaged in positions requiring only a teaching or special 
services certificate.
(k) A unit could be composed solely of all administrators below 
the rank of superintendent.
(5) Any group of supervisory employees may as a group reject the 
''teacher unit” and not be represented or be represented with the "admin­
istrative unit".
(6) Any group of supervisory employees excluded by the "teacher 
unit” may be represented with the "administrative unit" or not be 
represented.
(7) Unit 9(2) can only exist if a majority of both the "teacher 
unit" and the "administrative unit" vote for such a unit to be estab­
lished. If either unit calls for a separate unit, said unit must be 
established.
Section 10. Certification of bargaining agent.
(1) If any employee organization shall receive more than fifty 
per cent of the recorded votes by the certificated employees of an ap­
propriate unit, then said employee organization shall be certified as 
the exclusive bargaining agent for that appropriate unit for not less
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than two years from the date of the election.
(2) No employee organization shall be certified as the represen­
tative of the certificated employees except after an election.
Section 11. Unfair practices.
(1) Employers, their agents or representatives are prohibited from 
the following unlawful acts:
(a) interfering with, restraining or coercing certificated em­
ployees in the exercise of the rights granted in this act;
(b) encouraging or discouraging membership in any employee or­
ganization in regard to hiring or tenure of employment or any terms or 
conditions of employment;
(c) dominating or interfering with the formation, existence, or 
administration of any employee organization;
(d) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the bar­
gaining agent of its certificated employees as provided in Section 6;
(e) discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee 
because he has signed or filed an affidavit, petition, or complaint or 
given information or testimony under this act;
(f) refusing to reduce to writing and sign an agreement arrived
at through negotiation and discussion.
(2) Certificated employees or employee organizations, their agents 
or representatives, are prohibited from the following unlawful acts:
(a) interfering with, restraining or coercing certificated em­
ployees in violation of their rights guaranteed by this act;
(b) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the
board or its bargaining agent as provided in Section 6;
(c) instituting, maintaining, or participating in a strike
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against any employer, or picketing any school or school facility or to 
induce a strike because of any controversy except as provided in Sec­
tion 16.
(3) Violations of this section may be injoined upon written com­
plaint of any party effected by any such violation in so far as the 
State Department of Education confers.
Section 12. Ratification of agreements. All professional nego­
tiation agreements reduced to writing and executed by an employer and 
the employee organization must be ratified by a majority of the cer­
tificated employees in the appropriate unit before becoming binding 
upon the parties. If a professional negotiation agreement is executed 
by a professional negotiation agent of the employer it must be ratified 
by a majority of the board.
Section 13» Service fees.
(1) The certified employee organization shall in a written state­
ment specify an amount of reasonable service fees necessary to defray 
the costs for its services rendered in negotiating and administering an 
agreement. The service fee shall be computed on a pro rata basis among 
all certificated employees contained in the appropriate unit and must be 
ratified by a majority of the certificated employees in said unit.
(2) The board upon receiving written notification from the cer­
tified employee organization that the specified service fee has been 
ratified shall deduct from the payroll of every certificated employee 
in the appropriate unit the amount of service fees and remit the amount 
to the exclusive representative.
(3) The deduction permitted by this section shall extend to any 
employee organization that is certified as the exclusive representative
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of an appropriate unit. If an employee organization is no longer the 
certified representative of the appropriate unit, the deduction shall 
terminate.
Section 1̂ f. Negotiation Procedures.
(1) The board and the certified employee organization shall meet
at reasonable times and shall negotiate in good, faith with respect to
terms and conditions of employment.
(2) Any mutual agreement reached by the representative of the
board and the certified employee organization shall be reduced to
writing.
(3) The board shall have authority to enter into written agree­
ment with the certified employee organization setting forth a grievance 
procedure culminating in a final and binding arbitration, to be invoked 
in the event of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of a written agreement. In the absence of such a procedure, either 
party may submit the dispute to the State Department of Education for
a final and binding decision. A dispute over the terms of an initial 
or renewed agreement does not constitute a grievance.
Section 15. Impasse Procedures.
(1) If, after fifty (50) days following the commencement of nego­
tiation between the employer and certified employee organization or 
their designated representatives an agreement can not be reached upon 
any issue or issues presented, either party may notify the other and 
the State Department of Education in writing that it desires to pre­
sent the issue or issues to a mediation panel. The mediation panel 
shall consist of three (3) persons who are residents of the state in 
which the employer is located, one to be selected by the certified em­
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ployee organization, and one to be selected by the employer, and the 
third to be selected by the first two named, who shall act as chairman 
of the panel. Each party shall select its panel member within ten (10) 
days after such notification. If the members selected by the parties 
are unable to agree upon the third member within ten (10) days from 
the date of their selection, then the third member shall be selected 
by the State Department of Education. Negotiations shall thereupon 
continue before the mediation panel.
(2) If an agreement has not been reached by the parties within 
twenty (20) days after the presentation before the mediation panel has 
commenced, the panel shall make findings of fact and recommendations 
concerning the issues discussed and shall serve a copy upon both par­
ties within five (5) days after such twenty (20) day period. Within 
five (5) days following mailing of such findings and recommendations, 
the parties must notify in writing the State Department of Education 
and each other whether or not they accept the findings and recommenda­
tions of the panel.
(3) Unless both parties do so accept, the panel shall publicize 
its findings of fact and recommendations in such manners it deems ad­
visable. Not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) days after 
such publication of the findings of fact and recommendations of the 
panel, the parties shall again notify in writing the State Department 
of Education and each other whether or not they accept the recommenda­
tions of the panel.
(k) The State Department of Education shall make public its re­
commendations on the issue or issues in dispute ten (10) days after it 
is notified in accordance with section 15 (3)* the parties shall notify
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in writing the State Department of Education and each other whether 
or not they accept the recommendations of the State Department of 
Education.
(5) The parties may further negotiate and settle the issues at 
any time before or after the recommendations of the panel. Each party 
shall pay the expenses of its selected member of the panel and both 
parties shall share equally the expenses of the third member of the 
panel and the publication costs.
Section 16. The Right to Strike.
(1) It shall be lawful for a certificated employee who is in an
appropriate unit involved in an impasse, to participate in a strike
after:
(a) all of the requirements of section 15 relating to the re­
solution of disputes have complied with in good faith;
(b) the certified employee organization has notified in writing
the employer and the State Department of Education of its intent to 
strike;
(c) ten (10) days have elapsed since the recommendations of the 
State Department of Education were made public in accordance with sec­
tion 15 (*0.
(2) No employee organization shall declare or authorize a strike 
of certificated employees which is or would be in violation of this 
section.
(3) The State Department of Education shall have the power to re­
move certification from any employee organization involved in an unlaw­
ful strike for a period of not less than twelve (12) months nor more 
than twenty-four (2*0 months from the date of the unlawful strike.
Section 17. This act shall not operate so as to annul, modify or 
preclude the renewal or continuation of any lawful agreement heretofore 
or hereafter entered into between a board and certified employee or­
ganization in accordance with the procedure provided in this act.
Section 18. Severability* This apt shall be severable, and 
should any part or provision hereof be declared unconstitutional by a 
competent court, such declaration will not invalidate the remaining 
provisions hereof.
APPENDIX II
MONTANA
PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ACT FOR TEACHERS 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE TEACHING PROFESSION, RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT OF 
TEACHERS TO JOIN ORGANIZATIONS OF THEIR CHOOSING, PROMOTING COOPERATION 
AND DISCUSSION BETWEEN SCHOOL BOARDS AND TEACHERS, ESTABLISHING PROFES­
SIONAL NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES, RECOGNIZING BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVES.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF MONTANA:
Section 1. Short title. Sections 1 through of this act shall 
be known as the "Professional Negotiations Act for Teachers."
Section 2. Declaration of policy and purpose. In pursuance of 
the duty imposed upon it by the constitution to provide a system, of free 
public schools and to adopt all means necessary and proper to secure to 
the people the advantages and opportunities of education, the legisla­
tive assembly hereby declares that it recognizes teaching as a profes­
sion which requires special educational qualifications and that to ac­
hieve high quality education it is indispensable that good relations 
exist between teaching personnel and their governing boards. It is, 
therefore, the policy of this state to recognize the rights of profes­
sional school employees to form, join, or assist professional employees' 
organizations to negotiate with their governing boards regarding the 
terms and conditions of professional service and to confer and consult
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in other matters for the purpose of establishing, maintaining, protect­
ing and: improving educational standards, and to establish procedures 
which will facilitate and encourage amiable settlement of disputes. It 
is further recognized that the authority of public school district 
boards of trustees is established by law and a district board of trus­
tees has final authority for determining policies for the operation of 
public schools under its jurisdiction which are not inconsistent with 
law.
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this act* unless the context 
clearly requires otherwise:
(1) "Teacher” means an individual certificated in class 1, 2, k or 
5 as provided in section 75-6006, R.C.M. 19^7*7but shall not include 
such certificated individuals who are not currently under contract to 
perform classroom teaching; however "teacher” shall include principals 
certificated in class 3 who so elect as provided in subsection (3).
(2) "Employer” means a school district as defined in section 75- 
6501, R.C.M. 19^7.
(3) "Appropriate unit” means all of the teachers employed by a 
single employer. Principals employed by an employer may elect to be 
included in the appropriate unit or may elect to establish a separate 
appropriate unit of principals.
(*1) "Board" means any public school board of trustees.
(5) "Strike” means any work stoppage by a teacher or teachers 
which interferes with the operation of a school or Schools, which in- 
eludes abstinence in whole or part from the full, faithful, and proper 
performance of the duties of employment, for the purpose of inducing, 
influencing, or coercing an employer to change any terms or conditions
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relating to the employer-teacher relationship.
(6) "Teacher organization" means any organization of employees 
which includes teachers in its membership.
(7) "Representative of Teachers" means a representative elected 
pursuant to the provisions of section 7*
Section k. Teachers1 rights. It shall be lawful for teachers 
to organize, form, join or assist in employee organizations or to engage 
in lawful activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own free choice. 
Teachers shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such 
activity but shall be bound by a professional negotiations agreement 
involving the appropriate unit of which they are a member. It shall 
be the duty of an employer to meet and confer on any proposal advanced 
by a representative of teachers, or by a teacher group if no represen­
tative of teachers has been selected, if such proposal does not en­
deavor to amend the terms of a professional negotiations agreement 
then in effect, and nothing in this act shall be construed to diminish 
such duty. However, a representative of teachers selected as provided 
by this act, shall be the exclusive representative of all the teachers 
in the appropriate unit to meet, confer or negotiate upon all matters 
permitted in section 5 and such teachers shall not negotiate individ­
ually.
Section 5* Duty to negotiate and bargain. It shall be the duty 
of all employers acting as a board, or acting by and through a bargain­
ing agent designated or employed by the employer, and all teachers, or 
a representative of teachers, to meet and confer for professional nego­
tiations purposes at the request of either, except as provided by this
Bk
act, to discuss matters relating directly to the employee-teacher rela­
tionship such as salary, hours and other terms of employment, and to 
negotiate and bargain for agreement on such matters* The matters of 
negotiation and bargaining for agreement shall not include matters of 
curriculum, policy of operation, selection of teachers and other per­
sonnel, or physical plant of schools or other school facilities, how­
ever nothing herein shall limit the obligation of employers to meet and 
confer as provided in section k. Teachers under a professional nego­
tiations agreement, or the representative of teachers, shall not de­
mand that professional negotiation conferences begin until after 
November 1 of the last year such agreement is effective but, if profes­
sional negotiation is desired, must serve written notice of intention 
to negotiate collectively upon the employer not later than November 1 
of such year stating specifically the items to be negotiated. If such 
notice is not served, the employer shall not be required to negotiate 
any terms of the employer-teacher relationship for the following school 
year. Professional negotiation agreements in effect at the time this 
act becomes effective shall continue to their expiration. No profes­
sional negotiation agreement shall extend for a term of more than two
(2) years.
Section 6. Unfair practices.
(1) Employers, their agents or representatives, are prohibited 
from the following unlawful acts:
(a) Interfering with, restraining or coercing teachers in any 
manner in their right of self-organization or selection of a represen­
tative.
(b) Discriminating in regard to conditions of employment when
85
the purpose is to discourage membership in a teacher organization.
(c) Refusing to meet, confer or negotiate in good faith with 
teachers or the duly elected representative of an appropriate unit of 
teachers or with a panel selected upon impasse as provided in section 9, 
to discuss or negotiate upon any matter dealing directly with the era- 
ployer-teacher relationship as provided in section *t.
(d) Refusing to reduce to writing and sign a professional nego­
tiation agreement arrived at through negotiation and discussion.
(2) Teachers or teacher organizations, their agents or represen­
tatives, are prohibited from the following unlawful acts:
(a) Restraining or coercing teachers in violation of their 
rights guaranteed under section k or interfering in the conduct of an 
election as provided in section 6.
(b) Refusing to reduce to writing or sign a professional neg­
otiation agreement arrived at through negotiation and discussion.
(c) Instituting, maintaining or participating in a strike or 
boycott against any employer, or picketing any school or school facility 
to further or to induce a strike or boycott because of any controversy, 
engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual to engage in, a 
strike or refusal to handle goods or perform services or threatening, 
coercing or restraining any individual where the object thereof is to 
force or require any employer to discontinue doing business with such 
individual or to force or require an employer to recognize a teacher 
representative not selected as provided in section 7.
(d) Refusing to meet, confer or bargain in good faith with an 
employer or its agents or with a panel selected upon impasse as provided 
in section 9, to discuss or bargain upon any matter dealing directly
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with the employer-teacher relationship as defined in section 5.
Section ?• Selection of teachers’ representative. Any teacher 
organization whose membership includes a majority of the teachers in 
the appropriate unit, as verified by affidavit of the secretary of the 
teacher organization delivered to the employer, shall be recognized by 
the employer as the representative of teachers in the appropriate unit, 
however, (1) if the membership of more than one (1) teacher organiza­
tion desiring to represent the appropriate unit includes a majority of 
the teachers in the appropriate unit or (2) if no teacher organiza­
tion's membership includes a majority of the teachers in the appropriate 
unit but thirty (30) per cent or more of the teachers in the unit have 
petitioned the board, in writing, for a particular representative, or
(3) if the employer questions whether a majority of the teachers in the 
appropriate unit desire the representation of a teacher organization 
determined by organization membership and applied for an election, the 
board or his representative to represent the teachers in the appropriate 
unit. The board shall give not less than ten (10) nor more than thirty 
(30) days written notice of the time and place of such election by 
mailing to all teachers in the appropriate unit and by posting in the 
school or schools where such teachers teach. The board shall include 
on the ballot the names of all teacher organizations verified by affi­
davit to include a majority of such teachers, then the names of all 
prospective representatives offered by the petition of thirty (30) per 
cent or more of the teachers in the unit received by the board not less 
than five (5) days prior to the date for election, and in either event 
the choice of nno representative." One candidate must receive a major­
ity of the votes cast to be recognized as the representative of the
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teachers in the appropriate unit* If uno representative*' rocoivoo a 
majority, no representative shall be recognized. If two (2) or more 
prospective representatives are named on the ballot and no choice re*, 
ceives a majority, a second election, after notice, shall be conducted 
naming the two (2) proposed representatives receiving the greatest num­
ber of votes in the first election. A determination under this section 
by secret ballot shall remain in effect for one (1) year after the date 
of the election and thereafter until the employer or thirty (30) per 
cent or more of the teachers in the appropriate unit shall apply to the 
board for another election.
Section 8. Ratification of agreements. All professional negotia­
tion agreements reduced to writing and executed by an employer and the 
representative of teachers must be ratified by a majority of the teach­
ers in the appropriate unit before becoming binding upon the parties.
If a professional negotiation agreement is executed by a professional 
negotiation agent of the employer it must be ratified by a majority of 
the board of the employer.
Section 9. Professional negotiation. If, after fifty (50) days 
following the commencement of negotiation between an employer, and a 
negotiating agent designated by the employer, and teachers, or a repre­
sentative of teachers, an agreement can not be reached upon any proper 
issue or issues presented, either party may notify the other in writing 
that it desires to present the issue or issues to a panel of three (3) 
persons, residents of the state in which the employer is located, one (1) 
to be selected by the employer, one (1) to be selected by the represen­
tative of teachers, and the third to be selected by the first two (2) 
named, who shall act as chairman of the panel. Each party shall select
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its panel member within ten (10) days after such notification. If the 
members selected by the parties are unable to agree upon the third mem­
ber within ten (10) days from the date of their selection, the senior 
district judge of the county in which the employer is located shall 
submit the names of five (5) persons to the parties at impasse and each 
party shall in the presence of such senior district judge ..alternately 
strike one (1) name until only one (1) shall remain. The teachers or 
representative of teachers shall strike the first name. The person so 
remaining shall be the third panel member. Negotiation shall thereupon 
continue before the panel. The panel may take oral testimony under 
oath and shall consider all documents and arguments presented to it.
If an agreement has not been reached by the parties within twenty (20) 
days after presentation before the panel has commenced, the panel shall 
make findings of fact and recommendations concerning the issues dis­
cussed and shall serve a copy upon both parties within five (5) days 
after such twenty (20) day period. Within five (5) days following 
mailing of such findings and recommendations, the parties must notify 
the county superintendent of schools and each other whether or not they 
accept the findings and recommendations of the panel, and unless both 
parties do so accept, the panel shall publicize its findings of fact 
and recommendations in such manner as it deems advisable. Not less than 
five (5) days nor more than ten (10) days after such publication of 
findings of fact and recommendations of the panel, the parties shall 
again notify the county superintendent of schools and each other whether 
or not they accept the recommendations of the pariel. The parties may 
further negotiate and settle the issues at any time before or after the 
recommendations of the panel. Each party shall pay the expenses of its
89
selected member of the panel and both parties shall share equally the 
expenses of the third member of the panel and the publication costs.
Section 10. Employer's right under other state laws. Nothing 
contained in this act shall impair the employer's right to hire teachers 
or to discharge teachers for cause consistent with other state laws.
Section 11. Court review. An employer, a duly elected represen­
tative of teachers, or if no representative of teachers has been selec­
ted, then a teacher or group of teachers, may institute proceedings in 
the district court for the county in which the employer is located to 
restrain the commission of any unlawful or unfair practice as provided 
in this act. Any teacher acting in violation of any court order to en­
force the provisions of this act shall be subject to suspension without 
pay or dismissal at the discretion of the employer.
Section 12. Penalty for violation. Any teacher who violates the 
provisions of section 6 (2)(c) shall forfeit his salary for every day 
that he is in violation.
Section 13» Planning for negotiating sessions closed to public. 
Professional negotiating sessions between employers and teachers, or 
their representatives, may be open to the public, but meetings of school 
boards wherein professional negotiating proposals are discussed prior to 
any professional negotiating sessions shall be closed to the public.
Section 14. This act shall not operate so as to annul, modify or 
preclude the renewal or continuation of any lawful agreement heretofore 
or hereafter entered into between a board and a teacher organization. 
This act shall not preclude the modification of any existing agreement 
upon the request of either the board or the teacher organization in ac­
cordance with the procedure provided in this act.
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Section 15. Severability. This act shall be severable, and 
should any part or provision hereof be declared unconstitutional by a 
competent court, such declaration will not invalidate the remaining 
provisions hereof.
Effective date - July 1, 1971
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